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I. INTRODUCTION: THE TWO FACES OF TITLE IX

A. Amy Cohen
Amy Cohen is the face of Title IX.' Intelligent and athletic, she was
the prototypical "scholar-athlete" during her four years as a Brown
University undergraduate. A talented and dedicated gymnast, Cohen
helped the Brown varsity women's gymnastics team win its first Ivy
League title in 1990; one year later, she was named the team's cocaptain.' As a second-semester junior leading a thriving varsity squad,
Cohen's affection for her university equaled her love of gymnastics.3
Thus, Cohen felt devastated, as if by a fratricide, when she heard that
her beloved university would be taking her beloved sport away.4
Rumors became reality when Brown athletic director David Roach
told Cohen that the university needed to cut 2.7%, or roughly $115,500,
from its athletic budget.' To do so, he decided to reduce women's

1. Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) §§ 901-909, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688
(1994).
2. Telephone Interview with Amy Cohen (Jan. 21, 1996) (on file with author).
3. Id.
4. Id. Cohen repeatedly emphasized that she "loved Brown. To bring a lawsuit against
the university was not something I wanted to do." Id.
5. Id.; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 981 (D.R.I. 1992), afTfd, 991 F.2d 888
(1st Cir. 1993).
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gymnastics and volleyball, and men's golf and water polo, from6
intercollegiate varsity athletic status to "intercollegiate club" status.
Stunned, Cohen pleaded with the athletic director to ask all the varsity
teams to trim 3% of their budgets, rather than force these four, lowrevenue sports to assume all the costs of budget-cutting themselves."
According to Cohen, the more she persisted, the angrier Roach became
Finally, Roach dismissed Cohen by asserting that his decision was final
and there was nothing his office could do to help?
Thus, as co-captain of a fledgling club team with no university
support, Cohen worked all summer to raise approximately $20,000 to
fund the squad; this included, among other things, performing flips for
donations during Brown's graduation festivities."0 The fundraising
campaign succeeded, but upon returning to Brown in the fall, the
realities of the team's new status set in: the squad was permanently
locked out of the varsity weight room and locker room; the varsity
trainers were not allowed to provide medical attention, except in rare
emergencies. The event operations staff was no longer available on the
weekends, forcing the team to schedule all its meets on weekdays,
which often resulted in squad members missing classes.11
Finally, after the athletic department's continued refusal to ease the
team's transition from varsity to club status, Cohen turned to the
courts. 2 "I had never even heard of Title IX at the time," Cohen said
recently, "[until] coaches from other schools began talking to us about
it."' 3 Indeed, as soon as she learned that Title IX prohibits genderbased discrimination by any educational institution that receives federal
financial support, she thought "it was very obvious that Brown was in
violation."14 Cohen filed for a preliminary injunction to reinstate the
women's gymnastics and volleyball teams to full varsity status, and to

6. Telephone Interview with Amy Cohen (Jan. 21, 1996); see also Cohen, 809 F. Supp.

at 979.
7. Telephone Interview with Amy Cohen (Jan. 21, 1996).

8.Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.Cohen also set up gymnastics clinics, organized a letter drive, asked competing
teams for contributions, solicited corporate sponsorships, sold t-shirts, and contacted every
alumnus who had ever given her team money. Id.

11. Id.
12. Id. Cohen said that after the gymnastics team was cut, Roach refused to help or even
show sympathy for the team's plight: "[Roach] basically turned to me and said 'Your team is
gone as far as I'm concerned. We got rid of you. We're not going to help you.' . . . And he
didn't help us, and we fought for every one of those little nit-picky things." Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1687 (1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893

(Ist Cir. 1993).
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stop Brown from cutting any other women's varsity athletic team until
the percentage of women athletes participating in varsity sports equaled
the percentage of women enrolled at Brown. 5 When the dust finally
settled in April 1993, the women's teams were reinstated, and the
landmark case of Cohen v. Brown University16 had shifted control over
a university's athletic budget from school administrators to Washington
regulators. 7
B. William Kelley
William "Bill" Kelley is the other face of Title IX. As co-captain of
the men's varsity swimming team at the University of Illinois, Kelley
led a competitive squad within the Big Ten Conference-the "fastest
swimming conference in the nation.""8 As the state's flagship educational institution, the University of Illinois had the most prominent and
successful swimming program in the state.' A second-semester junior,
Kelley looked forward to his final year of intercollegiate competition on
a team that would feature ten talented freshmen.' Kelley, who gave
half his time at the University of Illinois to his beloved sport, relished
the prospect of his team's future success. Although his squad would be
inexperienced, Kelley excitedly believed that it "had the potential to
move up in the standings in the upcoming years."'"
For Bill Kelley, however, the most important event for the future of
his team was not the infusion of young talent in 1993, but rather a vote
by the Big Ten Conference one year earlier. Unbeknownst to Kelley, his
athletic conference had sealed his team's fate in May 1992 by deciding,
in effect, to eliminate 640 male athletes from the conference's varsity
teams.' Far away from the varsity swimming pool at Urbana-Cham15. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980.
16. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), affg 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992).
17. See, e.g., R. Lindsay Marshall, Comment, Cohen v. Brown University: The First
CircuitBreaks New Ground Regarding Title IX's Applicationto IntercollegiateAthletics, 28 GA.
L. REV. 837, 854-61 (1994) (concluding that by assuming "interests and abilities" existed unmet
by university programs, the courts merely relied on proportionality tests to determine which new
women's athletic programs the university should offer).
18. Telephone Interview with William Kelley (Jan. 29, 1996) (on file with author);
electronic mail from William Kelley to the author (Jan. 30, 1996) (on file with author). The Big
Ten Conference is "a group of 11 universities who associate together for the purpose of
competing in intercollegiate athletics." Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp.
237, 240 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aT'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
19. Telephone Interview with William Kelley (Jan. 29, 1996); electronic mail from
William Kelley to the author (Jan. 30, 1996).
20. Electronic mail from William Kelley to the author (Jan. 30, 1996).
21. Id.
22. Carol Herwig, Big Ten Gives Women's Sports a Boost, USA TODAY, May 13, 1992,
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paign, representatives from all eleven Big Ten schools voted 10 to 1 in
favor of a proposal requiring at least 40% female athletes at member
institutions by August 1, 1997.23 Realizing that only 30.5% of its
varsity athletes were female despite a 50-50 male-to-female ratio among
its students, the Big Ten hoped its pre-emptive strike would stave off a
future Title IX onslaught.24
Conference officials also were cognizant of the budget constraints
that faced Big Ten schools, and, for that matter, universities throughout
the country' In an era of shrinking budgets and increasing demands
for gender equity, the Big Ten settled on the most cost-effective way to
solve the problem of disproportionate athletic participation rates: the
conference told its schools to cut men's sports.26
As with Amy Cohen, Bill Kelley was devastated when he heard that
his team would, be eliminated.' The men's swimming coach told
Kelley that financial problems, along with the Big Ten's new 60-40
plan, were forcing the university's hand.' As with Amy Cohen, Kelley

at IC. Big Ten Commissioner Jim Delaney noted that with 6640 athletic opportunities in the
conference at the time of the vote, "It's going to require about 640 opportunities on the male
side transferred over to the female side." Indiana University athletic director Charles Doninger
said that "increasing participation by women will increase costs. The ways of reducing costs will
have to come from the men's program." Id.; see also Catherine Pieronek, A Clash of Titans:
College Footballv. Title IX,20 J.C. & U.L. 351, 369 (1994) (noting that athletic directors voted
to implement proportionality criterion to achieve gender equity that might cost men 640
participation slots).
23. Herwig, supra note 22.
24. See Carol Herwig, Big Ten Eyes Student-Athlete Parityin Gender, USA TODAY, May
11, 1992, at 7C; Pieronek, supra note 22, at 369.
25. See Herwig, supra note 24,at 76. I use the term "universities" throughout this Article
to refer to all institutions of higher learning, including colleges.
26. See, e.g., Transcript of Big Ten Gender Equity Task Force Meeting, May 1992
(unpublished document obtained by John Otto, counsel for Bill Kelley, during discovery of the
files of University of Illinois Athletic Director Karol A. Kahrs; on file with the author) (listing
"Steps to achieve gender equity... 1. Encourage women to join athletic teams even if they do
not receive an athletic scholarship. 2. Identify women's sports which can be upgraded from club
status. 3. Limit the size of men's teams. 4. Identify the sports that hold the greatest appeal for
female athletes, and create Junior Varsity teams. 5. Eliminate Mens [sic] teams. 6. Hold out for
NCAA Financial Aid Restrictions.") (emphasis added); cf George A. Davidson & Carla A. Kerr,
Title IX: What Is Gender Equity?, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 25, 26 (1995) ("In this era of
tight budgets, achieving a varsity participation ratio that is proportionate to enrollment would
require most institutions to eliminate men's teams and to create women's teams.").
27. Telephone Interview with William Kelley (Jan. 29, 1996). On May 7, 1993, the
University of Illinois announced that it intended to cut the varsity programs for men's
swimming, fencing and diving, and women's diving. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240. The women's
swimming team was preserved. Id.
28. Telephone Interview with William Kelley (Jan. 29, 1996).
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never thought that his treasured program would be taken away.2 9 As
with Amy Cohen, Kelley had never heard of Title IX until his team was
eliminated.3" And as with Amy Cohen, when his pleading and protests
were met by deaf ears at Illinois, Bill Kelley turned to the courts.3 '
But here is where their paths diverged, for while Kelley and his 27
teammates received sympathy from the federal trial judge,32 the court
countenanced what it called the sacrifice of "innocent victims of Title
IX's benevolent attempt to remedy the effects of an historical
deemphasis on athletic opportunities for women."33
Some of Kelley's teammates did not wait for the court's adverse
ruling to be affirmed on appeal by the Seventh Circuit, choosing instead
to transfer to other schools.34 Transfer was not a viable option for
Kelley, who was nearing graduation. After three years of representing
his university in competitions against its Big Ten rivals, his own
university unexpectedly became his rival in a game of winner-take-all.
C. Roadmap
Part II of this Article examines the history of Title IX and its effects
on intercollegiate athletics. The section shows how the legislators who
drafted the antidiscrimination statute neither intended nor expected Title
IX to be transformed by administrative fiat into an affirmative action
statute that mandates gender quotas. The section also shows how Title
IX has transformed the world of intercollegiate athletics both for the
better-female athletic participation rates have skyrocketed since Title
IX's passage-and for the worse-low-revenue men's teams such as
wrestling and gymnastics are being eliminated at an astonishing rate.
Part III of this Article examines why, after a string of major successes
in the courts and Congress, Title IX can no longer count on either
branch of government for support. In fact, the section posits that a
newfound skepticism towards Title IX in Congress and the judiciary-along with a recent, unintended threat from the Clinton administration-is likely to culminate in either an overhaul of the venerable
antidiscrimination statute, or its elimination. Part IV of this Article
briefly concludes that Title IX's future prospects look bleak. Its

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 243-44.
33. Id. at 244:
34. Telephone Interview with William Kelley (Jan. 29, 1996); electronic mail from
William Kelley to the author (Jan. 30, 1996). One of the talented freshmen on the team went
on to star at rival University of Minnesota, where he broke a Big Ten swimming record. Id.
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legislative foundations shaky, its bureaucratic creators unknown, its
legitimacy now questioned, the statute is losing its adherents and is
facing extinction.
II. PAVED WITH VAGUE INTENTIONS: THE HISTORY
AND EFFECTS OF TITLE IX

On June 23, 1972, Congress enacted Title IX to ensure equal
opportunity for men and women at educational institutions that receive
federal funds.3 ' The vagueness of this goal is underlined by the fact
that Title IX was adopted in a congressional conference without any
formal hearings or committee reports.6 Indeed, Congress was generally
opposed to placing intercollegiate athletics under the auspices of Title
IX9' and sports were only mentioned twice in the entire congressional
debate.3 ' The ostensibly hollow legislative foundation for Title IX has
allowed its supporters and critics to impute different motivations to
Congress. The result has been an interpretive free-for-all among
universities, litigants, commentators, regulators, and judges. 39
A. Title IX's Legislative History
Billed by advocates as" 'the most significant event in the history of
sports,'

"'

and "the cornerstone of federal statutory protection for

female athletes and prospective female athletes in the United States,"'"
Title IX provides in pertinent part: "No person in the United States

35. See Pieronek, supra note 22, at 351.
36. Courtney W. Howland, Note, Sex DiscriminationandIntercollegiateAthletics: Putting
Some Muscle on Title IX, 88 YALE L.J. 1254, 1255 n.11 (1979).
37. Glenn M. Wong & Richard J. Ensor, Sex Discriminationin Athletics: A Review of Two
Decades of Accomplishments and Defeats, 21 GoNz. L. REV. 345, 361 (1985-86).

38. Howland, supra note 36, at 1255 n.l1 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972) (Sen.
Bayh) (personal privacy to be respected in sports facilities); 117 CONG. REC. 30, 407 (1971)
(Sen. Bayh) (intercollegiate football and men's locker rooms)).
39. See, e.g., Alexandra Polyzoides Buek & Jeffrey H. Orleans, Sex Discrimination-ABar
to a DemocraticEduction: Overview of Title IX of the EducationAmendments of 1972, 6 CONN.

L. REV. 1, 1 (1973) (advocating a broad reading of Title IX by quoting Alexis de Tocqueville
to impute Tocquevillian motivations to Congress, namely that 'Title IX was designed to ensure
that sex discrimination would no longer restrict any person from obtaining a 'democratic
education' "); Note, Sex Discriminationand IntercollegiateAthletics, 61 IowA L. REv. 420,457

(1975) (proclaiming Title IX as the manifestation of a congressional crusade to end sex
discrimination in collegiate sports).
40. Steve Wyche, Title IX Means Entitlement, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 20, 1995, at DI
(quoting Ann Marie Lawler, associate athletic director for women's sports at the University of
Florida).
41. Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 2 (1991-92).
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shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....
Although the statute's combination of broad language and limited
legislative history has given rise to many views of what Title IX is,
Congress has already told us what Title IX is not. Contrary to popular
belief, the legislative history that does exist is not "ambiguous"'43 about
prohibiting the use of quotas as a means of compliance.'
Title IX germinated in the summer of 1970 during a set of hearings
on discrimination against women before a special House Subcommittee
on Education chaired by Representative Edith Green. 45 Representative
Green unsuccessfully attempted to add the antidiscrimination principles
of Title IX to the Education Amendments of 1971. The Senate rejected
the amendment as nongermane to the bill under consideration.46
During Senate debate on the unsuccessful measure, the amendment's
sponsor, Birch Bayh of Indiana, explained that he was submitting the
amendment to "guarantee that women, too, enjoy the educational
opportunity every American deserves.,' 47 Senator Peter Dominick asked
Senator Bayh whether the amendment would affect universities that "try
to keep a certain quota or a certain ratio as between male and female

42. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1995).
43. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stating that
Title IX's legislative history is ambiguous), aft'd, 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982); Jeffrey P. Ferrier,
Title IX Leaves Some Athletes Asking, "Can We Play Too?," 44 CATH.U. L. REV. 841, 846
(1995) (finding "Title IX contained broad language but very little legislative history to clarify
its scope").
44. Donald C. Mahoney, Note, Taking a Shot at the Title: A CriticalReview of Judicial
and Administrative Interpretationsof Title IX as Applied to IntercollegiateAthletic Programs,
27 CoNN. L. REV. 943, 945 (1995) (recognizing that Title IX's legislative history is "replete
with comments" from members of Congress who sought to ensure that a quota system would
not be required).
45. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-95 n.16 (1979); Heckman, supra
note 41, at 9 n.30.
46. Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 534; Heckman, supra note 41, at 9 n.30. The proposed
amendment stated in pertinent part:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subject to discrimination under any
program or activity conducted by a public institution of higher education, or any
school or department of graduate education, which is a recipient of Federal
financial assistance for any education program or activity....
117 CONG. REc. 30,404 (1971).
47. 117 CONG. REC. 30,403 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
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students.... ."' Senator Bayh responded that university gender quotas.
were "exactly what this amendment intends to prohibit.... The
amendment does not contain, nor does the Senator from Indiana feel it
should contain, a quota which says there has to be a 50-50 ratio to meet
the test."4 9 Later in the debate, Senator Bayh reiterated that "[t]he
amendment is not designed to require specific quotas.... Let me
emphasize again that we are not requiring quotas.... What we are
saying is that we are striking down quotas. The thrust of the amendment
is to do away with every quota."5
Senator Birch Bayh reintroduced the amendment in its current form
one year later, stating that the new bill was a "comprehensive approach
which incorporates... the key provisions of my earlier amendment.... ,,."
The new Title IX was patterned after Titl&VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in public
facilities.52 Some members of Congress, however, still feared that the
amendment "would [ ]be construed to require a set number of males or
females in any educational endeavor." '3 Thus, the amendment's House
sponsor, Representative Albert Quie successfully added a section (b) to
Title IX that provides:
(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall
be interpreted to require any educational institutional [sic]
to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the members
of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any
federally supported program or activity, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any
community, State, section, or other area: Provided,That this
subsection shall not be construed to prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this title of
statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance
48. Id. at 30,406.
49. Id. at 30,406-07.
50. Id. at 30,409.
51. Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 534 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (Statement of Sen.
Bayh)).
52. "This is identical language, specifically taken from title [sic] VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act... ." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694-95 n.16 (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971)
(statement of Sen. Bayh-Senate sponsor) (error in original)). Title VI states: "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1995).
53. Mahoney, supra note 44, at 946.
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exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the
benefits of, any such program or activity by the members
of one sex.""4
During debate on his amendment in the House Committee on
Education and Labor, Representative Quie made clear that it "would
provide that there shall be no quotas in this sex antidiscrimination
title."5 5 Just before the vote, Representative Quie emphasized that "[t]o
make it absolutely certain there will not be a requirement of quotas in
the graduate institutions and employment in institutions of higher
education similar to the prohibition against preferential treatment for
minorities under the Civil Rights Act I believe this legislation is
necessary."56 Representative Edith Green, the woman responsible for
the birth of Title IX, then took the floor to say she was "opposed to
quotas," since quotas "would hurt our colleges and universities. I am
opposed to [them] even in terms of attempting to end discrimination on
the basis of sex."57 Immediately after Representative Green's comments, the committee approved Representative Quie's antiquota
provision by a vote of 90 to 1."
During Senate debate, Senator Bayh said the impetus for Title IX
was to combat "the continuation of corrosive and unjustified discrimination against women" in the American educational system. 9 Demonstrating that Title IX was not intended to be, as some have later
characterized it, "the most significant event in the history of sports,"'
Senator Bayh introduced the measure by decrying the "sex discrimination [that] reaches into all facets of education-admissions, scholarship
programs, faculty hiring and promotion, professional staffing, and pay
scales."61
Senator John Beall agreed with Senator Bayh's portrayal of rampant
sex discrimination in America's universities, and said that the Republican minority was "willing to accept the amendment" as long as "we are
not establishing still another form of bias."'6 In particular, Senator
Beall hoped that Title IX would not mandate a faculty ratio of 50%
54. 117 CONG. REC. 39,261 (1971) (codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 39,262.
57. Id.
58. Id.; see also Mahoney, supra note 44, at 947.
59. 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
60. Wyche, supra note 40.
61. 118 CoNG. REc. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Unless "scholarship programs"
are understood as encompassing intercollegiate athletics, the latter is conspicuously absent from
the specific list of all "facets of education" remedied by Title IX.
62. Id. at 5813 (statement of Sen. Beall).
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women to 50% men.63 Easing his colleague's fears, Senator Bayh said
he "appreciate[d] the Senator's bringing out that point," but that his
amendment did "not require a 3 percent or a 55 percent balance."'
Three months later, in a written response to an educator's concern
about quotas, Senator Bayh referred to Representative Quie's amendment:
As you know, the House attached a floor amendment
specifying that the legislation would not require specific
quotas. I did not include such a provision as part of the
Senate amendment because I believe my amendment
already states clearly that no person, male or female, shall
be subjected to discrimination. The language of my amendment does not require reverse discrimination. It only
requires that each individual be judged on merit, without
regard to sex.6
Senator Bayh's repeated assurances on the issue of quotas helped to
secure Title IX's passage. The law went into effect on July 1, 1972."
B. Title IX's Regulatory Framework
1. The 1975 Regulations
Because Title IX became law without much debate about its effects
on intercollegiate athletics, Senator John Tower in 1974 proposed an
amendment that would have excluded revenue-producing sports from
coverage. 67 After the Tower Amendment died in a Senate-House
conference committee, Congress approved an amendment by Senator
Jacob Javits as a compromise. 6' The Javits Amendment required the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to publish Title
IX regulations " 'which shall include with respect to intercollegiate
athletic activities reasonable provisions considering the nature of
particular sports.' ,69

63. Id.

64. Id.
65. 118 CoNG. REc. 18,437 (1972) (letter from Sen. Bayh) (emphasis in original); see also
Mahoney, supra note 44, at 948-49.
66. See Mahoney, supra note 44, at 949.
67. Howland, supra note 36, at 1255, 1255 n.13 (citing 120 CoNG. REC. 15,322 (1974));
see also PAUL C. WEMLER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 624 (1st ed. 1993).
68. See Mahoney, supra note 44, at 950.

69. Id. at 950 (quoting Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484 (1974) (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1988)).
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HEW submitted its final regulations on May 27, 1975 to President
Gerald Ford for authorization. 70 After authorization, President Ford
submitted the regulations to Congress, which, under federal law, had 45
days to exercise a "legislative veto" if it found the regulations" 'inconsistent with the Act from which [HEW] derives its authority ..... ",7
Although resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both Houses of
Congress, none were adopted, and the regulations became effective on
July 21, 1975.72
The Supreme Court has noted that "Congress' failure to disapprove
the HEW regulations does not necessarily demonstrate that it considered
those regulations valid and consistent with the legislative intent. 7 3 In
fact, Congress knew that rejecting the long-awaited regulations would
leave the intended beneficiaries of Title IX without any remedy for an
extended period of time.74 Although Congress believed that more
specificity was warranted, this concern was "outweighed by the need to
fulfill reasonable expectations of a timely remedy. 75 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals has similarly rejected HEW's claim that congressional
inaction towards the Title IX regulations means congressional approval.76 Indeed, only four months after the regulations were promulgated,
Congress passed an amendment to the General Education Provisions Act
that provides:
Failure of the Congress to adopt such a concurrent resolution [of disapproval] with respect to any such final regulation ... shall not represent, with respect to such final
regulation, an approval or finding of consistency with the
Act from which it derives its authority for any purpose,
n[or] shall such failure to adopt a concurrent resolution be
construed as evidence of an approval or finding of consistency necessary to establish a prima facie case, or an
inference or presumption, in any judicial proceeding.77

70. Heckman, supra note 41, at 12-13.
71. North Haven Bd.of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 531-32 (1982) (quoting the General
Education Provisions Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 567 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232(d)(1), replaced by Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 247, 108 Stat. 3913, 3923 (1994)).
72. Id. at 532-33.
73. Id. at 533-34.
74. Howland, supra note 36, at 1262, 1262-63 n.61.
75. Id. at 1262-63 n.61 (citing Letter from Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, to
Carl B. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (June 4, 1975)).
76. Islesboro Sch. Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 428 n.3 (1st Cir.) (finding that
"congressional inaction should not lightly be construed as approval"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976), replaced by Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 247, 108 Stat.
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Still, once the new regulations went into affect, and HEW had the
power to terminate all federal funding to rogue institutions, quotas
became the norm. HEW used its regulations to order universities to
provide athletic scholarships to "members of each sex in proportion to
the number of students of each sex participating in interscholastic or
intercollegiate athletics."7 Moreover, and more vaguely,
EW's
regulations required "equal athletic opportunity for members of both
sexes" at schools operating interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or
intramural athletics.79 As to what constituted "equal athletic opportunity," the regulations provided a list of ten non-exclusive factors to
consider:
(1)

Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities
of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity. 0
The amorphous "interests and abilities" factor atop this list-which
soon would become the most important area of inquiry--exemplified the
ambiguity of the regulations. To make matters worse, HEW explicitly
disavowed any clear-cut monetary expenditure test to determine
university compliance, stating that "[u]nequal aggregate expenditures for
members of each sex... will not constitute noncompliance with this
section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide
necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex."" Further, HEW gave schools three years
3913, 3923 (1994).
78. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(1) (1995).
79. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1995). This Article discusses Title IX's relevance only to
intercollegiate athletics, even though Title IX's scope reaches beyond America's colleges and
universities to "any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 34
C.F.R. § 106.1 (1995).
80. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1995).

81. Id.
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to comply with Title IX or face a loss of federal funds.8 2 Thus, with
the stakes so high, and with such little guidance as to what Title IX
exactly required for compliance, university administrators greeted
HEW's regulations with exasperation. 3
Adding to the confusion, in 1979 Congress split HEW into the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department
of Education (DED), transferring all the education functions of HEW to
DED. Title IX administration, in turn, was assigned to DED's Office of
Civil Rights (OCR).84 The HEW regulations, however, were left with
HHS while OCR created its own, nearly identical, Title IX regulations."
2. The 1979 Policy Interpretation
Although the three-year transition period for Title IX compliance
expired on July 21, 1978, HEW responded to university complaints
about the vagueness of its new regulations by issuing a Policy Interpretation on December 11, 1979--only months before the effective date of
the HEW split.86 After OCR took over Title IX administration, it began
to follow HEW's Policy Interpretation, seemingly as a matter of course,
without engaging in any formal process for adopting the document. 7
Neither reviewed nor approved by Congress or the President-and
not formally approved by OCR itself' s -OCR's Policy Interpretation
was only meant to clarify the meaning of "equal opportunity" consistent
with the 1972 statute and subsequent regulations. 9 In reality, however,
the Policy Interpretation has taken on a life of its own, becoming the
most powerful and controversial guidepost in the Title IX regulatory
morass. 9' It has expanded the scope of Title IX to the point of subvert82. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1995); 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
83. Jill K. Johnson, Title IX and IntercollegiateAthletics: CurrentJudicialInterpretation
of the Standardsfor Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 553, 558 (1994).
84. See Pub. L. No. 96-88, §§ 101-511,93 Stat. 669 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510);
20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(1), (a)(3) (1995); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 n.7.
85. See 45 C.F.R. 86 (1995); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (decrying this "wonderful example
of bureaucratic muddle," and noting that the two sets of regulations are "identical, save only for
changes in nomenclature reflecting the reorganization of the federal bureaucracy").
86. Johnson, supra note 83; OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413-23 (1979);
see Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896.
87. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896. Since OCR in practice adopted HEW's entire Policy
Interpretation as its own, this Article will henceforth attribute the document to OCR.
88. See id.
89. See OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413-14 (1979); Melody Harris, Hitting
'Em Where It Hurts: Using Title IX Litigation to Bring Gender Equity to Athletics, 72 DEN.
U. L. REV. 57, 61 (1994).
90. See infra pt. III.
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ing the statute's original purpose of prohibiting educational discrimination against either sex.9" Although Title IX was originally crafted by
the elected representatives of those subject to its dictates, it was
dramatically altered seven years later through the Policy Interpretation,
by unelected, anonymous bureaucrats, unaccountable to the public at
large. As a result, a statute that had been designed to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex was now transformed by the Policy Interpretation into an affirmative action law that mandated gender quotas.9 2
Perhaps most disturbing is the possibility, suggested by some
commentators, that the Policy Interpretation was a deliberate "attempt
by the agency to rewrite the regulations and to bypass the legislativeveto procedure."93 But regardless of whether OCR intended that its
Policy Interpretation do more than "clarify" Title IX and its regulations,
the fact remains that Congress never reviewed, debated or approved-either by an affirmative vote or by a failure to act-what
would become the most powerful and controversial component of its
antidiscrimination law. In reality, since it is only an interpretive
statement and not a regulation, the Policy Interpretation "is not entitled
to any more deference than is warranted by whatever inherent persuasiveness it may have."94 But as this Article shows, the courts have
overlooked this principle in Title IX cases.
OCR divided its Policy Interpretation into three parts: (1) compliance
in financial assistance (scholarships) based on athletic ability;9 (2)
compliance in other program areas (i.e., addressing factors two through
ten of the aforementioned list of ten compliance factors from the
regulations);9 6 (3) compliance in meeting the interests and abilities of
male and female students (i.e., addressing the first factor from the
aforementioned list of ten compliance factors from the regulations).'

91. See Mahoney, supra note 44, at 953.
92. See, e.g., Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 241 ("Quite frankly, these [policy] interpretations

have converted Title IX from a statute which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex
(defined as the elimination of or exclusion from participation opportunities), into a statute which
provides 'equal opportunity for members of both sexes.' ") (citation omitted); Mahoney, supra
note 44, at 954.
93. E.g., Howland, supra note 36, at 1260 n.50.
94. Davidson & Kerr, supra note 26, at 34 (citing Drake v. Honeywell, Inc., 797 F.2d 603,
607 (8th Cir. 1986)). "It [Policy Interpretation] carries 'no more weight on judicial review than
[its] inherent persuasiveness commands.' " Id. at 34 n.48 (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, 648
F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
95. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414,71,415 (1979); 34 C.F.R. 106.37(c)(1)

(1995).
96. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414, 71,415-17 (1979); 34 C.F.R.

106.41(c)(2)-(10) (1995).
97. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,414, 71,417-18 (1979); 34 C.F.R.
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To comply with the first part of the Policy Interpretation, educational
institutions must make scholarship aid available to men and women in
"substantially equal amounts," although a strict dollar-for-dollar split
of
scholarship money is not required.9" OCR also will accept two nondiscriminatory factors that result in disparities in financial assistance: (1)
the difference between in-state and out-of-state tuition costs for students
at public institutions, and (2) "reasonable professional decisions
concerning the awards most appropriate for program development.""
As with the financial assistance rules, the second part of the Policy
Interpretation does not require "identical benefits, opportunities, or
treatment," as long as "the overall effect of any differences is negligible."'"0 This second area, which deals with equivalence in other
athletic benefits and opportunities, specifically defines "equivalence" as
meaning "equal or equal in effect."' ' Among the nondiscriminatory
factors that will justify disparate treatment is the "football exception,"
which recognizes that some aspects of certain sports may be unique. 2
Among other things, the football exception allows universities to pay
more for crowd control at men's sporting events than women's sporting
events if the crowd size necessitates it." 3 Such disparities, however,
are acceptable only if "any special demands associated with the
activities of sports involving participants of the other sex are met to an
equivalent degree.""'
By far the most important and controversial component of the Policy
Interpretation, the third part measures the effective accommodation of
student interests and abilities. 5 This section requires schools to
provide athletes of both sexes with the same opportunity to compete in

106.41(c)(1) (1995).
98. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979).
99. Id. The Policy Interpretation explains that this second factor acknowledges that team
development may at first require the spreading of scholarships over four years of student
athletes, rather than all at once. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 71,415-16. The policy interpretation states that such unique aspects "may
include rules of play, nature/replacement of equipment, rates of injury resulting from
participation, nature of facilities required for competition, and the maintenance/upkeep
requirements of those facilities." Id.; see also Philip Anderson, A Football School's Guide to
Title IX Compliance, 2 SPORTS L.J. 75, 81-83 (1995).
103. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416 (1979).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 989 ("'There is little question that this factor is the
most important criteria listed in [34 C.F.R.] § 106.41(c)"); Chuck Neinas, Yes: Purpose of
Statute Lost When Focus Put on Proportionality,USA TODAY, May 9, 1995, at C2 (discussing
the "misuse" of this crucial section).
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intercollegiate athletics, and with a level of competition that' equally
reflects their abilities."3 To comply with these dictates, a university
must meet any one of the following tests:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers
substantiallyproportionateto their respective enrollments;
or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the
institution can show a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex;
or
(3). .. [W]hether it can be demonstrated that the inter[the
ests and abilities of the members of...
effectively
and
full
been
have
underrepresented] sex
accommodated by the present program.
OCR has maintained that the first of the three alternate tests
[hereinafter the "proportionality test"] for compliance under the third
part of the Policy Interpretation, provides universities with a "safe
harbor" for establishing that they offer nondiscriminatory athletic
participation opportunities."' In reality, however, an analysis of these
three benchmarks reveals the extent of the bureaucratic capture of Title
IX. In direct contravention of Title IX's legislative history, the
proportionality test has been used to mandate gender quotas in intercollegiate athletics."°9 As the last two parts of the test have lost their
significance by their utter infeasibility, the proportionality test has
engulfed the other benchmarks and has dominated Title IX litigation. °
In the eyes of supporters and detractors alike, the proportionality test has
become Title IX and vice versa."'
106. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Letter from Norma V. Cant, DED's Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to interested
parties 2 (Jan. 16, 1996) (transmitting the final version of OFFICE FOR CIviL RIGHTS,
CLARIFICATION OF INTER-COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST)
(on file with the author).
109. Mahoney, supra note 44, at 954.
1
110. See Ferrier, supra note 43, at 865-68; J. Dennis Hastert, Title IX, p. (1995)
(unpublished paper, on file with the author).
111. E.g., Neinas, supra note 105; Hearing on Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972: HearingBefore the House Subcomm. on PostsecondaryEducation,TrainingandLfe-Long
Learningof the House Comm. on Economic andEduc. Opportunities,104th Cong., 1st Sess. 353
(1995) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Margaret A. Jakobson, principal complainant in U.S.
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This convergence has spelled disaster for universities in court. The
inability to reach the requisite female participation numbers has spurred
a remarkable losing streak for Title IX defendants: more than 30 Title
IX cases have been brought to court over the past three years, with the
plaintiffs prevailing in every case."' Without doubt, this trend will
continue if Title IX remains unchanged, as a recent survey found that
645 out of 646 NCAA" 3 schools would fail the proportionality
test. 114 Thus, rather than serving as a safe harbor for wayward educational institutions, the proportionality test has more closely resembled a
regulatory Bermuda Triangle.
3. The 1990 Investigator'sManual
Adding another layer of regulation to the bureaucratic mix, OCR
issued the Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual (Investigator's
Manual) in 1990."' The manual was designed to assist OCR investigators in their investigations of Title IX violations at interscholastic and
Dep't of Education Case #05-92-2099 against Minnesota's Moorhead State University); Jennifer
L. Henderson, Gender Equity in IntercollegiateAthletics: A Commitment to Fairness,5 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 133, 152 (1995) (incorrectly claiming that Title IX requires universities to
satisfy a "fifty-fifty" proportionality ratio).
112. Women's Sports Foundation, Gender Equity in Athletics/Title IX (1996) (downloaded
by author from World-Wide Web; <http://www.mcs.net/-sluggers/titleixfaq.html>); see alsoJoan
O'Brien, The Unlevel Playing Field: Women Athletes Still Run On, SALT LAKE TRiB., Sept. 4,
1994, at Al. Among the schools that have recently lost Title IX cases or settled out of court are
Brown University, Colorado State University, Cornell University, Auburn University, the
California State University system, and Temple University. See id.
113. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a private organization
comprised of a voluntary membership of approximately 900 colleges and universities. It was
formed early in the twentieth century at the behest of President Theodore Roosevelt, who
brought together the heads of major universities to develop playing rules for the dangerous game
of college football. Member schools agree to be bound by a lengthy and complex set of NCAA
rules and regulations designed to ensure "equity in competition" and other objectives. The
NCAA has four divisions: I-A, II, III and I-AA, with different standards of entry for each. For
example, Division I-A membership requires schools to have a minimum of six varsity sports,
while Division I-A schools must sponsor four varsity sports. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra
note 67, at 496-97; Wong & Ensor, supra note 37, at 345 n.1; James Delaney, Round Table
Discussion on Collegiate Athletics Reform, 22 J.C. & U.L. 96, 98 (1995); Deborah E. Klein &
William Buckley Briggs, Proposition48 and the Business of IntercollegiateAthletics: Potential
Antitrust Ramifications Underthe Sherman Act, 67 DENY. U. L. REv. 301, 304 nn.13-15 (1990).
114. Doug Bedell, Line of Skirmish: Title IX Gathers Force, but FootballPowers Huddle
to Fight Back, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 18, 1995, at B1. "The one school in compliance
was not disclosed." Id. But see Erik Brady, Weighing Equality: College Sports Still Tip Scale
Toward Men, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 1995, at Cl (stating that a USA Today survey of 94
Division I-A football schools found that nine would pass Title IX's proportionality test).
115. VALERIE M. BONNET=E & LAMAR DANIEL, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TITLE IX
ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (1990).
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intercollegiate athletic programs." 6 With regard to the Policy
Interpretation's third part--effective accommodation of student interests
and abilities-the Investigator'sManual stops short of defining exactly
what male-to-female athletic participation ratio satisfies the proportionality test." 7 The manual states that if a school is 52% male and 48%
female, "then, ideally, about 52% of the participants in the athletics
program should be male and 48% female... ,,11 But the manual then
emphasizes that "[t]here is no set ratio that constitutes 'substantially
proportionate' or that, when not met, results in a disparity or a
violation."" 9
The 166-page Investigator'sManualprovides a thorough checklist of
all the questions that OCR investigators should ask, and all the statistics
they should obtain, to determine whether a university complies with
Title IX. Unfortunately, length does not always translate into clarity,
as the manual provides few concrete examples to elucidate the ambiguous gender equity tests described in the OCR regulations and in the
Policy Interpretation."' More distressingly, the Investigator's Manual
is occasionally inconsistent with the regulations and the Policy
Interpretation. In turn, as stated earlier, the regulations and Policy
Interpretation are both inconsistent with the text and legislative history
of the Title IX statute itself."
For example, the manual uses "second-class status" as the yardstick
for ascertaining whether a Title IX violation has occurred," rather
than "equivalence" which is the standard used in the Policy Interpretation. " In addition, the Investigator's Manual introduces a new
"offsetting factor" approach, which has no basis in either the statute,
regulations or Policy Interpretation."z This sui generis provision
requires the investigator to analyze the number and significance of
disparities favoring the men's athletic program with the disparities
116. Id.
at [i].
117. Id.

118. Id. at 24.
119. Id.
120. Id. For example, under the "Accommodation of Interests and Abilities" part,
investigators are told to ask coaches whether the level of competition is "appropriate for the[ir]
team[s.]" The investigator is then advised to "[d]etermine the division level of each opponent,

if unable to obtain information from NCAA or other directory sources." Id.
121. See Heckman, supra note 41, at 16 n.64.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 48-66, 78, 92; see also Heckman, supra note 41,
at 16, 16 n.64.
123. BONNETrE & DANIEL, supranote 115, at 10; see Heckman, supranote 41, at 16 n.64.
124. See Heckman, supra note 41, at 16 n.64 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,415 (1979)
(setting forth "equivalence" as the proper standard for compliance)).
125. See id.; BONNETTE & DANIEL, supra note 115, at 8.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

favoring the women's program. According to the manual, "[i]f these
disparities offset each other, a finding of compliance is made."'" The
manual does not say how much weight this "offsetting factor" approach
gives to each specific disparity. 27 Rather, the manual gives each OCR
regional office the discretion to fill in'such gaps."
Another problem with the 1990 Investigator'sManual was that OCR
never fulfilled its promise to revise the document periodically. 29 In
addition, the manual was prepared without any form of congressional
guidance or approval, as well as without any input from interested
groups."I Neither approved nor recommended by Congress, the
Investigator's Manual is an internal agency document that gave no
public notice and sought no public comments, and thus is entitled to
3
little, if any, deference from the courts.1 1
4. The 1996 Clarification of the Three-Part Test
University officials, dissatisfied with OCR's 166-page Investigator's
Manual, found a receptive audience for their complaints when the
Republican Party won both houses of Congress in November 1994. In
a matter of months, the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary
Education, Training and Lifelong Learning
was holding hearings on
132
Title IX and its regulatory deficiencies.
126. BONNET=E & DANIEL, supra note 115, at 8; see Heckman, supra note 41, at 16 n.64.
127. See generally Heckman, supra note 41, at 32 n. 143 for a discussion of the weighting
problem. For example, under the InvestigatorManual's"offsetting factor" approach, a university
with a 50-50 male to female ratio might still comply with Title IX if its athletic participation
ratio is 65% male to 35% female, as long as the university spent 65% of its athletic budget on
women's sports. While this hypothetical university could achieve compliance based on the
Investigator's Manual, it clearly would fail Title IX under the Policy Interpretation's
proportionality test.
128. BONNETTE & DANIEL, supra note 115, at 4; Heckman, supra note 41, at 16 n.64.
129. Heckman, supra note 41, at 16 (citing Oversight Hearing: Office for Civil Rights,
Department of Education, Hearing Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 105-06 (1991) (statement of Michael L. Williams, Assistant Secretary of OCR)).
130. Id. at 16 n.64. In contrast, the Policy Interpretation received more than 700 public
comments, and was developed after HEW staff surveyed eight universities to see how the
proposed rules would apply in practice. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979).
131. See, e.g., Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Advance notice
and public participation are required for those actions that carry the force of law."); Flagstaff
Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 1325, 1343-44 (D. Ariz. 1991) ("Interpretative rules,
by definition, do not have the force of law. They are not binding on the agency, private parties,
or the courts .... Since interpretative rules are not binding on anyone, they, unlike legislative
rules, should not be given controlling significance."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 962 F.2d
879 (9th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
132. Hearing,supra note 111 (occurring six months after the November 1994 congressional
election).
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At the hearings, Brown University President Vartan Gregorian-widely known as a progressive leader of one of America's foremost
bastions of liberal thought--echoed the frustration felt by many
university officials when he complained of the difficulty encountered in
measuring female "interests and abilities" in sports in accordance with
the Policy Interpretation's crucial third part." Charles M. Neinas,
Executive Director of the College Football Association, beseeched the
House subcommittee to require that OCR issue new guidelines, since
"[t]he current Policy Interpretation... is outdated and lacks the
necessary clarification by... OCR.' ' "MDavid Joins, president of
Eastern Illinois University (EIU), testified that OCR continually refused
to offer any guidance as to how EIU could improve its compliance
efforts. 3 ' Jorns stated that even after OCR conducted a compliance
check, the agency refused to disclose its findings to EIU, despite
repeated requests from the university.3 According to Jorns, OCR
instead sent the university an extensive settlement proposal that the
parties had never discussed previously. 37 With the investigative
process shrouded in secrecy, Jorns could only interpret OCR's settlement proposal as a requirement that E1U add four women's sports
almost immediately, regardless of the university's financial constraints.' In the proposal, OCR also required that the university pull
out its gymnasium bleachers two rows further for women's events, in
order to make the amount of bleacher rows equal for men's and
women's sports.'39
In response to complaints from confused university administrators
such as Jorns, Representatives Howard "Buck" McKeon and Steve
Gunderson told Norma V. Cant6, the DED's assistant secretary for civil
rights, to provide more specific rules for Title IX compliance or else

133. John E.Mulligan, Gregorian: Brown Is a Loser Under Title IX, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL.,
May 10, 1995, at Al. During questioning, Gregorian mocked a college board survey of high
school girls' sports interests, which revealed that 800 girls were interested in equestrian sports.
Id. An exasperated Gregorian exclaimed that "We don't have stables! Maybe in Newport...
Id.
134. Hearing,supra note 111, at 207.

135. Id. at 102-03.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 102.
Id.
See id. at 102-03.
Id. at 103. In the end, EIU was forced to eliminate its men's swimming and wrestling

teams to pay for the addition of the four new women's teams. Id. Among the new teams
mandated by OCR was women's field hockey, a sport "not even played in Illinois to any
extent... ," thereby requiring EIU to import players from the northeastern part of the country
where the sport is more prevalent. Id. at 102-03.
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face possible congressional intervention."4 On June 9, 1995, Secretary
Canti agreed to provide the requested clarifications, and on September
20, 1995, OCR released a draft of its latest attempt to clear up the
ambiguities surrounding Title IX.14
The document, entitled Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics
Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test [hereinafter Clarification],42
was released with the expressed purpose of elaborating upon the threepart test of the Policy Interpretation's third part, used to measure the
effective accommodation of student interests and abilities. 143 In a letter
accompanying the Clarification, Canto emphasized that "OCR is not
revisiting the Title IX regulation or the Title IX Policy Interpretation,"
but instead was distributing the document "to demonstrate in concrete
terms how [compliance] factors will be considered."'" Cant's letter
specifically disavowed the use of "strict numerical formulas or 'cookie
cutter'5 answers to the issues that are inherently case- and fact-specif4
ic.'

1

In so doing, OCR reaffirmed its policy of embracing flexibility over
the clarity that comes with drawing bright-lines. The Clarification
repeated OCR's longstanding position that the proportionality test does
not require exact proportionality of enrollment to athletic participation,
and that "nothing in the three-part test requires an institution to
eliminate participation opportunities for men." 146 The Clarification

140. Mary C. Curtis & Christine H.B. Grant, Gender Equity in Sports (last modified Mar.
22, 1996) <http://wwwl.arcade.uiowa.edu/proj/ge/up-to-date.html #102>.
141. Id.
142. Office for Civil Rights, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The
Three-Part Test (Draft) (Sept. 20, 1995).
143. Letter from Norma V. Cant, DED's Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to interested
parties I (Sept. 20, 1995) (on file with the author); OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg.
71,414, 71,417-18 (1979); 34 C.F.R. 106.41(c)(1) (1994).
144. Cantd, supra note 143.
145. Id.
146. Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy, supra note 142, at 2, 9. The
hypotheticals in OCR's Clarification,however, seem to give universities little wiggle room in
case exact proportionality is not achieved. As the following hypothetical from the Clarification
demonstrates, a disparity of one percentage point between female enrollment rates and female
athletic participation rates may be all that OCR anticipates for complying institutions:
[I]f an institution's enrollment is 52 percent male and 48 percent female and 52
percent of the participants in the athletic program are male and 48 percent female,
then the institution would clearly satisfy part one. However, OCR recognizes that
natural fluctuations in an institution's enrollment and/or participation rates may
affect the percentages in a subsequent year. For instance, if the institution's
admissions the following year resulted in an enrollment rate of 51 percent males
and 49 percent females, while the participation rates of males and females in the
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kept the formula for determining participation opportunities under the
proportionality test, which is to count the number of athletes actually
participatingin the athletic program, rather than the potential athletes
who are left out.14
Since the Clarification essentially just reiterated the status quo,
reaction to the document was predictable: Brown University athletic
director David Roach complained that "[ilt really didn't clarify a heck
of a lot.... What a lot of athletic directors want to know is: What is
substantial proportionality? Is it 5 percentage points? Is it 7? Is it one
standard deviation?"'48 Some Title IX supporters, however, lamented
that the Clarification did not go far enough to protect women's
sports." All in all, OCR received comments from more than 200
interested parties in the 30-day comment period after the agency
circulated its draft."s
In particular, one of the most popular suggestions from Title IX
critics was to recommend that "opportunity slots" be incorporated into
the proportionality test.' This would enable a university to determine
participation opportunities by counting the number of athletes who could
be supported if they showed up to play on a team. That is, unlike
the current policy, where proportionality is analyzed by counting the
number of athletes actually participating in sports, the "opportunity
slots" proposal would include unfilled positions when calculating
participation rates.
In the end, this suggestion was not incorporated into OCR's final
Clarification." Relatively unchanged from the draft in spite of the
comments received by the agency, the final version of the document was
distributed to 4500 interested parties on January 16, 1996."s In an

athletic program remained constant, the institution would continue to satisfy part
one because it would be unreasonable to expect the institution to fine tune its
program in response to this unexpected change in enrollment.
Id. at 4.
147. See id. at 4.
148. Erik Brady, FederalLaw Still Being Defined 23 Years Later:Departmentof Education
Drafting Clarifying Document, USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 1995, at C4.
149. Cantt, supra note 108, at 1.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 4.
152. Letter from J. Dennis Hastert, Member of Congress, to Norma V. Cant6, DED's
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights 1 (Oct. 30, 1995) (on file with the author).
153. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEsT

(1996).

154. Letter from Kay Casstevens, DED's Assistant Secretary for Legislation and
Congressional Affairs, to all members of.Congress (Jan. 16, 1996) (on file with the author).
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accompanying letter, Secretary Cantti asserted that "OCR does not
require quotas," but admitted that "[a]n institution can choose to
eliminate or cap teams as a way of complying with part one of the
three-part test."' 55
Although OCR had expressly disavowed quotas, the Clarification
offered several curious hypotheticals that seemed to mandate a fairly
rigid quota to satisfy the proportionality test.1" In particular, while the
final Clarificationstated that proportionality determinations are made
"on a case-by-case basis, rather than through use of a statistical test,"
one hypothetical-added to the revised Clarification-seemed to
establish that a disparity of five percentage points is a per se violation
of Title IX: 57
For instance, Institution A is a university with a total of 600
athletes. While women make up 52 percent of the
university's enrollment, they only represent 47 percent of its
athletes. If the university provided women with 52 percent
of athletic opportunities, approximately 62 additional
women would be able to participate. Because this is a
significant number of unaccommodated women, it is likely
that a viable sport58could be added. If so, Institution A has
not met part one.
This example seems to require universities to establish a quota for
female athletic participation that is within five percentage points of male
athletic participation. According to the hypothetical, as long as a
"significant number" of women are unaccommodated (essentially the
third prong of the three-part test) and a "viable sport" could be added,
a disparity of five percentage points between female enrollment and
female
athletic participation is a per se violation of the proportionality
1 59
test.
Aside from the questionable assumption that women and men share
the same level of interest in sports,16° the hypothetical is also noteworthy for its dubious prediction that an increase in female participation

155. Cantti, supra note 108, at 3-4.
156. See, e.g., supra note 146.
157. Canti, supra note 108, at 3-4.
158. CLARIFICATION, supra note 153, at 5.
159. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979). A sport is "viable" if "there
is a sufficient number of interested and able students and enough available competition to sustain
an intercollegiate team," regardless of the team's financial costs to a university. CLARIFICATION,
supra note 153, at 4-5.
160. See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
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will have no effect on male participation rates."' In other words,
OCR's hypothetical assumes that the effect of achieving exact proportionality is to enable 62 additional women to participate in athletics."
The problem is that this "expanding pie" prediction does not reflect the
zero-sum realities of university budget constraints. As the following
section will show, universities do not follow the hypothetical "Institution
A" in keeping male participation rates constant, but have instead moved
towards proportionality by giving women many positions formerly
occupied by men. Thus, while the ideal "Institution A" might create 62
extra positions for women, today's real "Institution A" would create
only 31 positions for women while taking away 31 positions from men
to reach the same proportionality goal. 63
Furthermore, the final version of the Clarification strikes a blow
against privately funded intercollegiate teams, such as the Princeton
University wrestling squad. In determining participation opportunities
under the proportionality test, the Clarification specifically includes
"athletes who compete on teams sponsored by the institution even
though the team may be required to raise some or all of its operating
funds."'" Thus, even though a Princeton alumni group has pledged to
raise the entire $2.3 million cost to revive the school's defunct wrestling

161. See supra note 158. The following calculation demonstrates how the Clarification's
hypothetical requires male participation rates to remain constant in order to conclude that
approximately 62 additional women would participate if women comprised 52%, as compared
to 47%, of athletes at an institution of 600 students.
Step 1 (determining the amount of male and female athletes): 600 x .47 = 282 women; 600 282 = 318 men.
Step 2 (determining how many additional female athletes are needed to raise the percentage
of female athletes to 52%): 282 + Addt'l Women / 600 + Addt'l Women = .52. The numerator
in the preceding equation represents the new total number of women participating, while the
denominator represents the new total number of athletes. This assumes that the number of male
athletes remains the same.
Step 3 (completing the preceding equation): 312 + .52(Addt'l Women) = 282 + Addt'l
Women.
Step 4 (completing the preceding equation): 30 = .48(Addt'l Women).
Step 5 (completing the preceding equation): Addt'l Women = 62.5
162. See supra note 161.
163. See, e.g., Transcript of Big Ten Gender Equity Task Force Meeting, supra note 26;
William Kelley, Title IX Press Release, 1993 (unpublished document, on file with author)
(quoting Anne Goodman James, women's swimming coach at Northern Michigan University:
"[W]omen's [o]pportunities are not being increased much because proportionality is being
achieved by dtopping men's sports, rather than adding opportunities for women. It's become
anti-men, instead of pro-women"); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
164. CLARIFICATION, supra note 153, at 3; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp.
185, 201, 201 n.32 (D.R.I. 1995) [hereinafter Cohen I1](including varsity level, donor-funded
teams as intercollegiate teams for purposes of the proportionality test).
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program, the university would still have to fund additional female
athletic positions to match the male slots provided by the private
donors.'65 Not surprisingly, then, Princeton has repeatedly refused the
donations. 6
C. Title IX's Effects on Male and Female Participation
in IntercollegiateAthletics
Between 1972, when Title IX was passed, and 1978 the proportion
of female NCAA intercollegiate athletes skyrocketed from 7% to
approximately 33%.67 After 1978, this rapid growth stalled, due to the
expiration of the three-year compliance period," economic stagnation," and the realization among universities that "overburdened
federal agencies lacked the resources to make inspections or enforce the
law.' 170 By 1984, female participation in NCAA intercollegiate
athletics had regressed to 30.8%.'17
Immediately after Title IX's passage, universities also spent more on
women's athletics. NCAA Division I schools gave female athletes only
$27,000 in financial aid in 1973-74. By the 1981-82 academic year,
NCAA Division 72I schools were expending an average of $400,000 on
female athletes.
All these gains, however, were placed in jeopardy in 1984 when the
Supreme Court effectively removed intercollegiate athletics from Title
IX's reach.173 In Grove City College v. Bell, 74 the Court took a
narrow view of Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination in " 'any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.' ""', Noting that petitioner Grove City College was a private

165. Vic Feuerherd, Title IX Sparks Gender Battle: ParticipationBalance Focus of
Concern, WIs. ST. J., May 14, 1995, at Dl; Carol Innerst, FeministPaglia Takes Standfor Male
Victims of Bias Law: She Argues for Bringing Back Princeton Wrestling Team, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1996, at A2.
166. Innerst, supra note 165.
167. Joannie M. Schrof, A Sporting Chance?,U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 1994,
at 51, 52.
168. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1995).
169. Miriam Horn, 1973: Face to Face with Demons; The Way We Were, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1993, at 47, 49. Quite obviously, a poor economy inhibits a university's
ability to develop new teams and expand existing ones.
170. Schrof, supra note 167, at 52.
171. Wong & Ensor, supra note 35, at 347.
172. Id. Male athletes received an average $1.2 million in financial aid from NCAA
Division I schools in 1973-74, and $1.7 million in 1981-82. Id.
173. See Johnson, supra note 83, at 564.
174. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
175. Id. at 557 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
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college that refused state and federal financial assistance, 76 the Court
held that only the college's financial aid program-from which students
received DED Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs)-fell
under the auspices of Title IX. " In so doing, the Court rejected the
"institution-wide" view that since money is fungible, an entire educational institution becomes subject to Title IX whenever any of its
departments receive federal funds. 7 ' In lieu of the institution-wide
view, the Court deemed its narrower "program179specific" reading of Title
IX more consistent with congressional intent.
The Grove City decision had an immediate impact on Title IX
enforcement. Because few intercollegiate athletic programs received
direct federal funding, OCR circumscribed or discontinued its investigation of gender discrimination in athletics, and lower courts refused to
provide relief for disparate treatment."l
Five years later, Congress breathed new life into the moribund
antidiscrimination statute by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987 over a presidential veto."8 The Act replaced the Court's program-specific approach with the broader institution-wide approach by
defining "program or activity" as "all the operations of... a college,
university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of
higher education.., any part of which is extended Federal financial
assistance . .,,""
Congress' action reinvigorated OCR's enforcement efforts and
precipitated another rise in Title IX litigation regarding female participation in intercollegiate sports.' As Table 1 indicates, women now
comprise more of the new entrants in intercollegiate athletics than do
men. And while female participation rates continue to rise after OCR
renewed its Title IX enforcement efforts in 1988, male participation
rates appear to have peaked immediately after the Grove City decision.

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 559.
Id. at 573-74.
See id. at 573.
Id. at 572-73.

180. Harris, supra note 89, at 61, 61 n.25 (citing Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 799
F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the "ministerial relationship between financial aid
department ...and athletic program" was too attenuated "to bring the latter under Title IX"));
but see Haffer, 688 F.2d at 17 (holding that since Temple University received non-earmarked
federal aid, the entire university is to be considered the "program or activity" for Title IX
purposes, and thus its athletic department is covered by Title X).
181. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994)); see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 83, at 564.
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
183. See Johnson, supra note 83, at 565.
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TABLE 1

ParticipationRates Among Males and Females
at NCAA Schools"s
YEAR

MALE
PARTICIPANTS

FEMALE
PARTICIPANTS

TOTAL
PARTICIPANTS

MALE TO
FEMALE RATIO

1984-85

201,063

91,669

292,732

68.7% - 31.3%

1989-90

177,156

89,212

266,368

66.5% - 33.5%

1990-91

184,593

92,778

277,371

66.5% - 33.5%

1991-92

186,045

96,467

282,512

65.9% - 34.1%

1992-93

187,041

99,859

286,900

65.2% - 34.8%

1993-94

189,642

105,532

295,174

64.2% - 35.8%

Gains in female participation after 1992 can be attributed in part to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools.1 5 In Franklin, the Court held that a private litigant can
collect monetary damages for an intentional violation of Title IX.' 6
Indeed, at least 800 women's intercollegiate teams have been added
since 1992."7 Still, statistics reveal that, if gender equity is measured
by the male-to-female ratio in intercollegiate sports, a proverbial "glass
sneaker" continues to exist. 8 Women comprise only about 36% of
intercollegiate athletic participants and receive only one-third of all
184. Curtis & Grant, supra note 140. Title IX, however, should not be solely credited for
the rise in participation and funding of women's athletics. Other factors include a change in
societal attitudes towards women, and increased subsidies for women's sports by the NCAA
since 1981. See Wong & Ensor, supranote 37, at 348. In the 1981-82 sports season, the all-male
NCAA began holding championships in women's sports for the first time. Association for
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 735 F.2d 577, 580
(D.C. Cir. 1984). The NCAA's entry into women's athletics diminished the role of the
Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), the governing body for women's
athletics. Id. Although the AIAW had grown to 961 colleges and universities in 1980-81,
competition from the larger, wealthier and older NCAA drove the AIAW out of existence on
June 30, 1982. Id. Two years later, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the AIAW's
antitrust suit against the NCAA for violations of the Sherman Act. See id. at 590.
185. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
186. Id. at 75 n.8. In 1979, the Supreme Court first recognized a private right of action
under Title IX. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
187. Laurie Tarkan, UnequalOpportunity,WOMEN'S SPORTS & FrrNESS, Sept. 1995, at 25,
26.
188. Heckman, supra note 41, at 63.
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scholarship money,'89 despite making up more than half of all
undergraduate enrollments.' 9' A 1992 NCAA survey of Division I-A
schools revealed that men's sports account for 80% of operating
budgets, and 84% of recruiting budgets.1 91
But although these statistics seem to indicate a continued bias
towards men in the way money and participation opportunities are
allocated at America's universities, not all male athletes benefit from
this ostensibly favorable treatment. As Bill Kelley's experience
demonstrates, the costs of Title IX have been thrust upon men in less
popular, low-revenue sports. Division I-A athletic departments on
average spend 52% of their total operating budgets, 52% of their total
scholarship budgets, and 65% of their total recruiting budgets on
football,"9 even though 67% of Division I-A football programs and
approximately 86% of all football programs lose money.1" Division
I-A football schools have an average of 108.07 football players, as
compared to a Division I-A average of 111.71 participants in all
women's sports combined.19
Meanwhile, low-revenue sports with smaller squads, such as
wrestling, have been pinned into a comer. Since Title IX's passage in
1972, more than 250 colleges and universities have eliminated their
wrestling programs. 95 Similarly, there are now 64 fewer men's
swimming teams and 46 fewer water polo teams than there were when
Title IX was enacted; these losses have occurred even though NCAA
membership has swelled to more than 900 institutions, compared to 704
members in 1974.1' And while Title IX prevented Brown University
from cutting Amy Cohen's gymnastics team,1 Title IX has not been
a savior for men's gymnastics squads. After losing more than 100 teams
since 1974, men's gymnastics can be found at only 31 sponsoring
schools-below the forty-school minimum required to hold an NCAA
championship. 9 '
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Women's Sports Foundation, supra note 112.
O'Brien, supra note 112.
Women's Sports Foundation, supra note 112.
Anderson, supra note 102, at 76-77.
Women's Sports Foundatioa, supra note 112. When Division H and I schools are

included, football lost money at 454 out of 524 institutions in 1992-or 86% of all schools.
Henderson, supra note 111, at 152, 152 n.116 (citing Alexander Wolf, Trickle-Down Economics,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 10, 1993, at 84).
194. Anderson, supra note 102, at 76.
195. Andy Baggot, Wrestling's Fate Enjoys Reversal, Wis. ST. J., Feb. 2, 1996, at D1.
196. J. Dennis Hastert, The Unintended Consequences of Title IX (1995) (unpublished
paper, on file with the author).

197. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907.
198. Bonnie DeSimone, Declining Sports Get PartialSave: All Championships Stay, for
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The decline of these venerable sports has given little satisfaction to
Title IX advocates, who see football as the real culprit and Title IX as
the scapegoat.' Indeed, the argument against football has merit. As
a potentially lucrative, traditional activity that can engender enormous
school spirit, prestige, and national media attention for a university,
football has remained a sacred cow among athletic directors, alumni, and
avid fans." While other sports are starved for funds, football players
continue to eat well-literally. Many schools give football players
allowances of $15 for breakfast and $25 for dinner,"' and sometimes
take the entire team to a pre-game movie and put the players up in q
hotel on the night before home games.' Some football coaches make
two to three times the salary of their university presidents. 3 Football
teams receive a maximum of 85 scholarships and usually take on more
than 20 walk-on players.' ° And although schools can earn millions of
dollars when their teams play in an annual bowl game, for most schools
not all of these earnings reach the school's treasury.2"5 Members of
athletic conferences split the largesse with other members, and many
schools send upwards of 100 players on charter flights to these
extravaganzas and spend freely-within NCAA guidelines-while
there. 2 6

Now, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 10, 1996, at D1. Recognizing the impact of budget cuts
and gender equity requirements, the NCAA in a close vote gave a three-year waiver for
championships in sports contested in the Olympics, such as men's gymnastics. IdL; see also
Hastert, supra note 110; Hastert, supra note 196.
199. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 111, at 121 (statement of Christine H.B. Grant,
University of Iowa Representative of the National Association of Collegiate Women Athletics
Administrators); Donna Lopiano, No ProblemsSolvable Without DamagingSuccess of Football,
USA TODAY, May 9, 1995, at C2 ("Football asking for special relief under Title IX is a lot like
IBM asking for an antitrust exemption!").
200. See, e.g., Ivan Maisel, CFA Officials Going After Title X, CHARLESTON GAZETTE &
DAILY MAIL, May 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11639448 ("College football has a long
history of believing a bootstrap-God-and-country message. That sort of rhetoric is politically
incorrect on college campuses these days. But so too is the message of the Republican Party,
and it's had a winning season ....).
201. See Tarkan, supra note 187, at 27.
202. Henderson, supra note 111, at 153. The cost of hotel rooms on the night before home
games ranges from $4000 to $7000 a night. Id. University presidents voted down a proposal at
the 1994 NCAA Convention to bar football teams from undertaking this unnecessary expense.
Id. (citing John Feinstein, Power Play Penalizes Both Sides, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1994, at D7).
203. Kevin B. Blackistone, Title IX Isn't About Male Slashing, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
May 18, 1995, at B9.
204. See Bedell, supra note 114; see also Hearing,supra note 111, at 192 (statement of
Wendy Hilliard, president of the non-profit Women's Sports Foundation).
205. See Heckman, supra note 41, at 44 n.197.
206. Id.; Blackistone, supra note 203. One of the more notorious examples was the 1984
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Still, the arguments against football should not be overstated, as
cutting football alone would not be the antidote for Title IX unfairness.
Title IX proponents who argue that trimming football's excesses would
allow universities to satisfy gender equity rules ignore the realities of
the proportionality test.' Even if football were excluded altogether
frbm the Title IX equation, approximately 55% of Division I-A
institutions still would fail the proportionality requirements.'
It is true, however, that with today's budget constraints and gender
equity requirements, the refusal of university athletic directors to pare
down football expenditures has forced the costs of Title IX compliance
onto the less popular men's sports.' Due to the intransigence of
athletic directors towards cutting football budgets, Title IX has instigated
a battle among the have-nots. The Amy Cohens and Bill Kelleys have
been left to fight for whatever resources football leaves behind. As the
respective verdicts in the Cohen and Kelley cases show, Title IX's

regulations make this fight a no-contest brawl.210

In reality, then, both sides of today's heated Title IX debate are right.
Yes, the nondiscrimination statute has been the prime mover in the rise
of female participation in intercollegiate sports. But at the same time, it

has been largely responsible for curtailing opportunities for men by
causing the demise of many men's teams. Paved with good, albeit
vague, intentions, the statute itself should not be blamed for the
languishing state of "minor" men's sports. Title IX, after all, was

Aloha Bowl in Hawaii, where Southern Methodist University earned $400,000 for participating
in the event. Heckman, supra note 41, at 44 n.197. By the time the team returned home from
the trip, only $16,699 remained. Id. (quoting DAVID WHrrFoRD,A PAYROLL TO MEET: A STORY
OF GREED, CORRUPTION AND FOOTBALL AT SMU 135 (1989)).
207. See Bedell, supra note 114 (stating that women's groups have recommended limiting
football perks in lieu of squad cutbacks as a way to satisfy Title IX); Hearing,supra note 111,
at 194 (statement of Wendy Hilliard) (testifying that, at many institutions, cutting football
scholarships from 85 to 50 would achieve Title IX compliance).
208. Peter Brewington, Big-Time Football Major Focus of Numbers Game: Women's
Leaders TargetSport; Coaches Say Enough on Cuts, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 1995, at C8. Of 94
Division I-A schools responding to the USA Today survey, only 42 would meet the proportionality test if football were excluded from the calculus. Id.
209. UM Drops Men's Golf, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15, 1992, at D7. Although the
University of Miami's football team has enjoyed enormous popularity and gridiron success since
1983, its athletic department eliminated its 50-year old men's golf team in 1992, citing "money
and Title IX requirements. .. ." Id. The golf team had won the Big East Conference tournament
the previous year. Id.; see also Wyche, supra note 40, at D5 (discussing the University of Miami
football team's impact on the school's Title IX compliance).
210. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 245. Norma V. Cantd, DED's assistant
secretary for civil rights, bluntly acknowledges that OCR has taken sides in the battle among the
have-nots:" 'Congress did not pass a civil rights law for the over-represented group.' "Brady,
supra note 148 (quoting Norma V. Cantl).
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designed to prohibit discrimination in education, not to establish mass
quotas for female athletes.
The truly culpable parties are the high-profile, high-expense football
programs, and, to a greater extent, HEW, DED and the courts that
presided over Title IX's metamorphosis. High-profile, high-expense
football programs are blameworthy because they have diverted money
and resources away from both female and male athletes in lowerrevenue sports. HEW, DED and the courts, meanwhile, are guilty of
complicity in rewriting Title IX into a rule book that has required
intercollegiate athletics to become a zero-sum game.
With the exception of the Grove City ruling in 1984, those in charge
of administering Title IX have erected a bureaucratic house of cards. So
far, that house has withstood scrutiny from all three branches of
government. As this Article shows, it is a house that is poised for
collapse.
Ill. THE CRUMBLING FOUNDATIONS OF TITLE IX
A. A Paean to Proportionality:The Judiciary'sInitial
Embrace of the Three-PartTest
1
1. Cohen v. Brown University"'

There was good reason why Amy Cohen had never even heard of
Title IX when her cause of action accrued.1 2 After all, by 1991, Title
IX remained somewhat of a mystery to the universities themselves, let
alone their students. The courts, meanwhile, had little opportunity to
clarify matters or even signal Title IX's importance. Although there had
been many Title IX complaints after Congress overruled Grove City in
1987, few of them had been litigated fully." 3 Indeed, the district court
in Cohen remarked that the case raised "novel issues concerning Title
IX and athletic programs," since there was "virtually no caselaw on
point. ' Two months later, when Brown University appealed the
211. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
212. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
213. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893 n.4. Private complainants had more incentive to pursue
litigation after the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin, where the Court unanimously held that
monetary damages were available in Title IX actions. 503 U.S. at 75 n.8; see supra note 186
and accompanying text.
214. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980. In reality, there had been three previous cases where the
courts addressed substantive elements of sports-related complaints under Title IX or analogous
state statutes. In Blair v. Washington State Univ., the Washington Supreme Court refused to
exclude the Washington State University football program from the scope of the state's
antidiscrimination law and Equal Rights Amendment of the state constitution. 740 P.2d 1379,
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court's adverse decision, it marked the first Title IX case ever to reach
a federal court of appeals on the statute's substantive issues.215
In Cohen, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary order to reinstate the
Brown University women's gymnastics and volleyball teams to varsity
status, and to prohibit Brown from eliminating or reducing the status of
any other women's intercollegiate team as long as Brown continued to
fail the proportionality test.216 During the 1990-91 academic year,
1382-83 (Wash. 1987) (en banc). This meant that football had to be included in calculations of
participation opportunities, scholarships and distribution of nonrevenue funds. Id. at 1383. The
court also affirmed the trial court's proportionality order, in which the university was required
to raise the female athletic participation rate until it "reached a level commensurate with the
proportion of female undergraduate students." Id. at 1381. The court, however, approved
"revenue retention," which allows a university to exclude sports-generated revenue from the
calculations of university financial support; this allowed each Washington State team to "reap
the benefit of the revenues it generate[d]." Id. at 1383.
In Cook v. Colgate Univ., a magistrate judge at the district court level held that Colgate's
refusal to upgrade its women's club ice hockey team to varsity status violated Title IX. 802 F.
Supp. 737, 750-51 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). Finding that the men's varsity hockey team received 50
times the financial support from the university as the women's hockey team, the court ordered
Colgate to grant varsity status to its women's hockey program, and to provide the team with
amenities equivalent to the men's program. Id. at 744, 751. On appeal, however, the Second
Circuit vacated the lower court's order because of mootness. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d
17, 19 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit's ruling-rendered 11 days after the First Circuit
decided Cohen-was based on the plaintiffs' decision to sue on behalf of themselves
individually, and not as part of a class action. Id. at 20. Since all of the complaining parties
would have graduated before the district court's order took affect, their Title IX action became
moot. Id.
In Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), members of the
women's gymnastics and field hockey teams brought a Title IX class action suit against the
Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP) seeking a preliminary injunction ordering ]UP to
reinstate their teams. Id. at 579-80. The university had cut their teams, along with the men's
soccer and tennis teams, to allay a budget crisis. Id. The district court, one month before Cohen,
809 F. Supp. at 986, issued the injunction after determining that IUP failed the Policy
Interpretation's three-part "interests and abilities" test. Favia,812 F. Supp. at 584-85. On appeal,
the Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the district court's order. Favia v.
Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 334-35 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit, however, did not
independently analyze Title IX, preferring instead to rely on the First Circuit's endorsement of
the Policy Interpretation's three-part test in the landmark Cohen litigation. Id. at 343-44; see also
Davidson & Kerr, supra note 26, at 41-42.
In a fourth case, Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'g 524 F. Supp. 531
(E.D. Pa. 1981), the Third Circuit required Temple's athletic department to comply with Title
IX, even though the athletic program received no direct federal assistance. Id. at 17; see supra
note 180 and accompanying text. But the parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement
before the case could be tried on its merits. See Henderson, supra note 111, at 138-39.
215. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893 n.4.
216. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980. The plaintiffs represented a class "of all present and
future Brown university women students and potential students who participate, seek to
participate, and/or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown."
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Brown funded 16 athletic teams for men and 15 for women, for a total
of 566 male participants (63.3% of all athletes) and 328 female
participants (36.7% of all athletes).217 The Brown student body,
however, was comprised of 2951 men (52.4% of all students) and 2683
women (47.6% of all students)." 8 In 1991, after the university ordered
it to reduce its budget, Brown's athletic department eliminated funding
for 4 of its 31 varsity teams-men's golf and water polo, and women's
gymnastics and volleyball-and demoted them to club status.2 19 The
cuts caused male athletic participation to drop to 529 students (63.4%
of all athletes), while female participation fell to 305 students (36.6%
of all athletes).2"
The Cohen plaintiffs argued that since they based their Title IX claim
almost exclusively on the "interests and abilities" factor from the
regulations, the Policy Interpretation's three-part test should be applied
to determine Brown's compliance.22 ' Although admitting that the
Policy Interpretation and "Investigator's Manual do not carry the force
of law or establish controlling standards for this court," Judge Pettine of
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island relied
on the two OCR documents as "important guides in unraveling the
requirements of the athletic regulation."2'
Judge Pettine then gave great deference to the Policy Interpretation's
three-part test by holding that a finding of noncompliance could be
based solely on the "three-part framework" found in the regulations.'
This meant that not only was OCR's three-part test relevant to determining Title IX compliance, but the test alone could represent the start and
finish of an entire Title IX inquiry, without any consideration of the
other nine factors set forth in the regulations. As a result, enormous
weight was suddenly transferred to the first step of the three-part test:
the controversial proportionality rule. In Cohen, after finding that Brown
had failed all three parts of the Policy Interpretation's test,2' Judge
Pettine held that Brown did not effectively accommodate the interests

Id. at 979. For additional facts about the Cohen case, see supra notes 1-17 and accompanying
text.
217. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 980-81.
218. Id. at 981.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 985; see 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1995); OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,414, 71,417-18 (1994).
222. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 988.
223. See id. at 989; see 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1995); OCR Policy Interpretation, 44
Fed. Reg. 71,414, 71,417-18 (1994).
224. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991-93.
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and abilities of female athletes, and issued a preliminary injunction
requiring the university to reinstate the women's gymnastics and
volleyball teams to varsity status.'
Referring to Cohen as a "watershed case," the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court decision. 6
The appellate court agreed that the Policy Interpretation deserved
"substantial deference" as a document interpreting OCR's own regulations."2 7 The court thus endorsed the Policy Interpretation's three-part
test, including its proportionality test, despite recognizing that "[i]t
seems unlikely, even in this day and age, that the athletic establishments
of many coeducational universities reflect the gender balance of their
student bodies."' The court also specifically sanctioned the elimination of men's teams as a way to achieve gender equity under the Policy
Interpretation's proportionality test:
Title IX does not require that a school pour ever-increasing
sums into its athletic establishment. If a university prefers
to take another route, it can also bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark of the accommodation test by
subtraction and downgrading, that is, by reducing opportunities for the overrepresented gender while keeping opportunities stable for the underrepresented gender (or reducing
them to a much lesser extent). 9
On remand, Judge Pettine rejected Brown's claim that the three-part
test, and its proportionality test in particular, were inconsistent with the
Title IX regulations. Refusing to proffer a numerical definition of
"substantial proportionality," the court determined that the proportionality test is satisfied "only where the institution's intercollegiate athletic
program mirrors the student enrollment as closely as possible."23' The
court then found that Brown "predetermine[d]" the gender balance of its
athletic program through the selection of sports it offered, coaches it

225. Id. at 999.
226. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 891.
227. Id. at 896-97 (citing Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991); Gardebring v. Jenkins,

485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)).
228. Id. at 898. The court's endorsement of the three-part test, however, was not
enthusiastic: "[W]hether we, if writing on a pristine page, would craft the regulation in a manner
different than the agency, are not very important considerations. Because the agency's rendition
stands upon a plausible, if not inevitable, reading of Title IX, we are obligated to enforce the
regulation according to its tenor." Id. at 899.

229. Id. at 898 n.15.
230. Cohen v. Brown Univ. [Cohen II], 879 F. Supp. 185, 199-200 (D.R.I. 1995).
231. Id. at 202.
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hired, and recruiting and admissions practices it implemented.232 Any
resulting disparities therefore could not be explained by nondiscriminatory factors. 33
Moreover, the court rejected Brown's argument that proportionality
should measure the participation ratio of men to women among students
who are interested in athletic participation rather than the participation
ratio among all students."M Brown's position would have contradicted
the proportionality test's assumption that males and females share the
same rates of interest in athletics.235 Instead, the court held that
Brown's position was untenable because it was impossible to quantify
"latent and changing interests. 236 Concluding that Brown failed the
three-part test, and thus violated Title IX, the court ordered the
university to submit a comprehensive compliance plan within 120
237
days.

When Brown submitted its proposed plan, the court rejected it and
fashioned its own remedy. On appeal after remand, the First Circuit
upheld the district court based on the "law of the case" doctrine, which
bound the First Circuit to its interpretation of Title IX in Cohen.2 39 As
to the specific relief ordered by the district court, the First Circuit
reversed, holding "that the district court was wrong to reject out-of-hand
Brown's alternative plan to reduce the number of men's varsity
teams" 24 because "[i]t is clear ...that Brown's proposal to cut men's
teams is a permissible means of effectuating compliance with the
statute."241

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 204-05.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 205, 206 n.44.
237. Id. at 210-13, 214.
238. See Cohen v. Brown Univ. [Cohen II], 101 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1996) (summarizing the district court's findings).
239. Id. According to the law of the case doctrine, "issues decided on appeal should not
be reopened unless the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, controlling
authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to such issues, or the decision
was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Id. at 168 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
240. Id. at 187.
241. Id. at 186-87.
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2'
2. Roberts v. Colorado State UniversiVy

During the 1991-92 school year, women comprised 35.2% of the
total athletes at Colorado State University (CSU), even though women
represented 47.9% of the undergraduate student population 3 In 1992,
facing fiscal problems due to state cutbacks in aid,2' CSU eliminated
its 18-member women's softball team and its 55-member men's baseball
team. 5 As a result, in the 1992-93 academic year, CSU's female
participation percentage rose to 37.7% of total athletes, while women
comprised 48.2% of the student body.2 The members of the defunct
varsity softball team then sued the university under Title IX, seeking
their team's reinstatement along with monetary damages2 7
Ruling for the plaintiffs, Judge Weinshienk of the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado adopted Judge Pettine's
holding in Cohen that the Policy Interpretation's three-part test can by
itself determine noncompliance with Title IX." Confining his Title IX
analysis to the "interests and abilities" factor from the regulations, Judge
Weinshienk concluded that CSU failed the crucial three-part test and
granted a permanent injunction requiring the reinstatement of the
softball programU9 In particular, the district court found that the
10.5% disparity between women's athletic participation and women's
enrollment failed the proportionality test.' The court based its
decision largely on Cohen's holding that Brown's 11.6% disparity was
fatal to the university. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
court and affirmed the injunction. Rejecting CSU's argument that
the district court ruling implicitly required the university to "maintain
parity" between women's athletic participation and women's enrollment,
242. 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Roberts v. Colorado State
Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
243. Id. at 1512.
244. Id. at 1518.
245. Id. at 1514; Renee Forseth et al., Comment, Progressin GenderEquity?: An Overview
of the Historyand Future of Title IX of the EducationAmendments Act of 1972, 2 VILL. SPORTS

& ENrT. L.F. 51, 77 (1995).
246. Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1512.

247. Id. at 1509.
248. Id. at 1511.
249. Id. at 1519.
250. Id. at 1513. The court mistakenly referred to the 10.5% disparity as 10.6%.
251. Id.; see Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991.
252. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834-35. The appellate court, however, found that the lower court
exceeded its authority in demanding that the reinstated softball team play a fall 1993 exhibition
season. Id. at 835. The Tenth. Circuit thus reversed this small part of Judge Weinshienk's

opinion. Id.
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the court stated that the proportionality test was only one of three
methods for complying with Title IX 3
3. Kelley v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois"
In a new twist to Title IX litigation, members of the men's swimming team sought a preliminary injunction to force the University of
Illinois to reinstate their squad. 5 On May 7, 1993, the university
announced it was eliminating varsity men's swimming, men's fencing,
and men's and women's diving. 6 The cuts were motivated by budget
constraints, Title IX proportionality requirements, and the Big Ten
Conference's new policy requiring schools to reach a 60%-40% goal for
male-female athletic participation.'z Before the cuts, male students
made up 363 (76.6%) of the university's 474 varsity athletes, although
they 2comprised
only 14,427 (56%) of the 25,846-member student
58
body
While sympathetic to the athletes' plight, Judge McDade of the
United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied
relief under Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 259 Noting
that this case was one of first impression, the court relied on Cohen for
the proposition that reducing men's participation was one way to
achieve Title IX compliance.2 ° Increasing women's opportunities, the
court held, was therefore not necessary under the proportionality
test. 26' As to the male students' claim for relief, the court ruled that as
long as the percentage of male athletes was substantially proportionate
to male undergraduate enrollment, only women could wield the Title IX

253. Id. at 829 n.6.
254. 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. II1.1993), af'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 938 (1995).
255. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 238-39. For additional facts about the Kelley case, see supra
notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
256. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240.
257. Id.; see Letter from Phyllis L. Howlett, Assistant Commissioner of the Big Ten
Conference, to Karol A. Kahrs, Associate Director of Athletics at the University of Illinois, and
Jack Weidenbach, Interim Director of Athletics at the University of Michigan (Dec. 17, 1991)
(on file with the author) (discussing the "impossib[ility]" of reaching Title IX requirements
without "wip[ing] out significant opportunities for male student-athletes"); Transcript of Big Ten
Gender Equity Task Force Meeting, supra note 26 (advising that limiting and eliminating men's
teams are ways to achieve gender equity).
258. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 240.
259. Id. at 243.
260. Id. at 241-42; Forseth et al., supra note 245, at 83.
261. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 241-42; Forseth et al., supra note 245, at 83.
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sword.2 In fact, the court mentioned that the University of Illinois
may have violated Title IX when it eliminated the one-member women's
diving team-but the sole diver was not a plaintiff in this case.263
Notably, Judge McDade took pains to admit that the Title IX statute
neither sanctioned nor anticipated the three-part test that would later
"convert[] Title IX from a statute which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sex.., into a statute which provides 'equal opportunity for
members of both sexes.' ,4 Labeling the men's swimming team
"innocent victims," Judge McDade recognized that "Congress, in
enacting Title IX, probably never anticipated that it would yield such
draconian results."265 Nevertheless, although Judge McDade conceded
that the regulations and interpretations could have been written
differently, he followed the leads of Cohen and Roberts by giving great
deference to OCR's Policy Interpretation, Investigator'sManual, and'
2"
Clarification.
Affrming the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit agreed that cutting the teams of the overrepresented
sex was a reasonable way to meet the proportionality requirement.267
In fact, the court rejected the oft-stated view of Title IX supporters that
Title IX was designed to increase women's athletic opportunities.268
Instead, the Seventh Circuit said that the statute's "avowed purpose is
to prohibit educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of
sex," which meant that the proportionality test is neutral as to which is
the preferred route to Title IX compliance: a university can either
increase women's teams or cut men's teams, all with the blessing of the
courts.2

9

In response to the plaintiffs' claim that the proportionality test
wrongfully mandated a gender-based quota, the court maintained that the
first part of the three-part test establishes only a safe harbor, not a rigid
numerical requirement.270 Without mentioning the budget constraints
plaguing American universities, the Seventh Circuit endorsed the Policy

262. Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 242.

263. Id. at 242 n.6.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 241 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and 34 C.F.R. § 106.41).
Id. at 243-44.
See id. at 242.
See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 269-70.
Id. at 272; see, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. E1706-03 (Sept. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep.

Lantos) (supporting Title IX as "the landmark law that opened the door to women's participation
in school sports").
269. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272.
270. Id. at 271 (citing Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828).
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Interpretation's three-part test as a flexible, reasonable approach to
measuring Title IX compliance. 7
4. Gonyo v. Drake University/7
In a case similar to Kelley, members of the men's wrestling team
sought a preliminary injunction to force Drake University to reinstate the
defunct squad.273 Unlike the University of Illinois in Kelley, Drake
explained its decision to cut the wrestling squad as a purely financial
one, without any reference to Title IX.274 When Drake announced its
decision to cut the wrestling program, 75.3% of the school's athletes
were 2male,
although men constituted only 42.8% of the entire student
75
body.
Judge Vietor of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa denied the plaintiffs' motion.276 Although the court
focused more on the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction than
the merits of the Title IX claim, it held that the mere fact that men were
overrepresented on Drake's athletic teams demonstrated that Drake had
already effectively accommodated the wrestlers' "interests and abilities. ' '2' Thus, even though the plaintiffs had lost their particular team,
the court found that the disproportionate number of male athletes in the
overall
athletic program precluded a finding that Drake violated Title
78
2

IX.

Undaunted, the wrestlers went ahead with their substantive Title IX
claim against the university in Gonyo v. Drake University (Gonyo
H).279 On March 10, 1995, Judge Vietor granted summary judgment
for the defendants, holding that the proportionality test foreclosed the
plaintiffs' suit.280 Citing the First Circuit in Cohen, the court determined that the Policy Interpretation, as "a considered interpretation of
the regulation
by the administering agency," deserved substantial defer281
ence.

271. See id.; see Forseth et al., supra note 245, at 86 n.225 ("The court seemingly ignored
the constraints of athletic budgets and ignored the practical lesson taught by all of the Title IX
cases: constriction of male athletic programs is the only safe way to comply with Title IX.").
272. 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
273. Id. at 990.
274. Id. at 992.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 996.
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995) [Gonyo II].
280. Id. at 1004.
281. ld. at 1003 (citing Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896-97).
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In Gonyo II, the plaintiffs raised a novel claim under Title IX's first
compliance area: the wrestlers claimed discrimination since male
athletes received a smaller share of Drake's athletic scholarships than
did female athletes.' Although 75.3% of Drake athletes were male,
men received 47% of the school's athletic scholarships in the 1992-93
academic year. Acknowledging that the Policy Interpretation did not
address a situation where the equal scholarship provision conflicts with
the proportionality test,28 the court nevertheless held that the proportionality test alone determined the result in this case." In so doing,
Judge Vietor elevated the "safe harbor" provision of proportional
participation into the overriding and defining test of Title IX. Stating
that "the paramount goal of Title IX is equal opportunity to participate,"
Judge Vietor concluded that the proportionality test "more comprehensively serves the remedial purposes of Title IX than does the scholarship
test and must prevail." '
B. Analysis of the Judiciary's Construction of
Title IX and Its Regulatory Framework
Although nothing in Title IX's language or legislative history
supports the use of proportionality as a measure of gender equity, most
Title IX cases since 1992 have relied on Cohen to exalt the Policy
Interpretation's three-part test and its proportionality "safe harbor" into
the sine qua non of Title IX compliance.' As a result, the courts have
sanctioned and even perpetuated the bureaucratic capture of the 1972
antidiscrimination measure into an affirmative action statute that
mandates gender quotas at America's colleges and universities.

282. Id. at 1003-04; OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979); 34 C.F.R. §

106.37(c)(1).
283. Gonyo II, 879 F. Supp. at 1004.
284. Id. The regulations explicitly require that scholarship opportunities be provided to
"members of each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics." 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(1). Taken literally, this rule
would mandate the disproportionate distribution of scholarships in favor of the overrepresented

sex. See id. In addition, although the court was correct that the Policy Interpretation does not
address this conflict between the scholarships area in 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(1) and the "interests
and abilities" area in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1), the court overlooked the Investigator'sManual
sui generis provision that requires OCR investigators to offset disparities favoring one sex with
the disparities favoring the other sex. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
285. Gonyo 11, 879 F. Supp. at 1004.
286. Id. at 1005-06.
287. See Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title
IX Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on
Student Body Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 845, 890-91 (1994).
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Quite simply, the main problem with the current Title IX compliance
regime is it is nearly impossible to satisfy. 8 The reason why female
Title IX plaintiffs have a perfect record in cour 89 is largely attributable to the almost impossible burden imposed by the Policy
Interpretation's three-part test. Although OCR continues to maintain that
the proportionality test is a safe harbor independent of the other two
prongs of the three-part test, in truth the proportionality requirement
engulfs the other two provisions, destroying the flexibility ostensibly
offered by OCR's regulatory framework.299
1. Benchmark One of the Three-Part Test: The
Problem with Proportionality
The Policy Interpretation itself recognizes, and in some ways accommodates, football's unique need for more resources than other
sports.29' But while OCR's "football exception" gives schools some
leeway to spend more to meet football's "special demands" such as
crowd control during games,2' this acknowledgment of football's
uniqueness is not compensated for in the calculation of the proportionality benchmark. In fact, the proportionality test penalizes schools with
football teams, as no women's sport comes close to fielding a team that
matches the average 108-member football squad at Division I-A
schools.29 As long as football is included in the proportionality
calculation, universities have almost no chance to meet proportionality
without eliminating other men's sports.294
Underlying the proportionality requirement is the assumption that
women share the same interest in athletics as men do. Although the
Policy Interpretation, Investigator's Manual and recent Clarification
readily accept this view, at least two considerations undermine this
proposition. First, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that when "real differences" exist between the sexes-including mere cultural differences-disparate treatment may be
justified.29
288. See Ferrier, supra note 42, at 864-68.
289. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
290. Cantd, supra note 108, at 3-4.
291. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
292. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416 (1994).
293. Anderson, supra note 102, at 76.
294. Even if all Division I-A football programs were eliminated, approximately 55% of
schools still would fail the proportionality test. Brewington, supra note 208.
295. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977) (holding that Alabama
prison system imposed a bona fide occupational qualification by setting restrictions on female
correctional counselors; male preference for females as sexual assault victims reflected a real
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Second, and perhaps most importantly, OCR has never publicly
released any data supporting the dubious assumption that males and
females are equally interested in athletics. The evidence that does exist
points to the contrary proposition. As Table 2 indicates, the 1993
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Student Descriptive Questionnaire shows
that males are nearly twice as likely as females to want to participate in
intercollegiate athletics.2"
TABLE 2

Results of the 1993 Scholastic Aptitude Test's
Student Descriptive Questionnaire
STUDENTS
ANSWERING THE
QUESTIONNAIRE

STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN HIGH
SCHOOL ATHLETICS

STUDENTS INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING
IN INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS

MALES

484,810

275,192 (56.76%)

216,760 (44.71%)

FEMALES

555,568

225,070 (40.51%)

133,338 (24%)

Since men are more interested in participating in intercollegiate
athletics than their female counterparts, the effect of the proportionality
test is to allocate a disproportionately high number of participation slots
to women. By using a university's total enrollment as the relevant
population group for comparing athletic participation rates, rather than
the population of students interested in athletic participation, the
proportionality test ensures that male athletes have a smaller chance to
obtain a participation slot than female athletes. This in itself may violate
Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), and
Title IX's much-overlooked provision prohibiting affirmative action in
difference between the sexes); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per
curiam) (stating that conflicting family obligations may be more relevant to a woman's job
performance than a man's job performance); see also Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex
Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 913, 944 (1983) ("[I]t is clear from the
cases... that [the Court is] willing to include cultural behavior patterns... as sources of 'real'
differences.").
296. Scholastic Aptitude Test's Student Descriptive Questionnaire, Educational Testing
Service, Princeton, N.J. (May 5, 1993) (unpublished profiles of SAT and Achievement Test
takers; on file with the author).
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20 U.S.C. § 1681 (b), and goes against congressional intent demonstrated
by the statute's legislative history.2"
2. Benchmark Two of the Three-Part Test:29 The Economic
Realities of Expanding Athletic Opportunities
As stated earlier, the budget constraints plaguing American universities make it exceedingly difficult for schools to comply with the second
prong of the three-part test. To satisfy this prong, a university must
show that its athletic program is in the process of expanding and that
this continuing expansion has been increasingly responsive to the
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex.2 Although the First
Circuit in Cohen maintained that "Title IX does not require that a school
pour ever-increasing sums into its athletic establishment," 3" no court
has said how a university can meet the "continuing expansion" test
without making additional expenditures that it cannot afford in lean
economic times."' In Cohen, the First Circuit admitted that "in an era
of fiscal austerity, few universities are prone to expand athletic
opportunities." 3"
For example, after Title IX's passage in 1972, Brown created 14
women's varsity teams-more than double the number of teams most
universities have today.3"3 But as Brown President Vartan Gregorian
observed, the university's immediate surge towards Title IX compliance
actually undermined its chance to meet the three-part test's second
benchmark: "If you move too fast and too far, it's too bad. If you had
paced yourself, gone slowly, providing only incremental changes, you
would have been better off."' "' While a slower approach would have
reduced women's athletic opportunities during the 1970s and 1980s,
ironically, it would have increased Brown's chances of satisfying the
"continuing expansion" test, and its inability to satisfy the nearly
impossible proportionality test would not have mattered.
Indeed, because Brown's rapid expansion of women's athletic
opportunities in the 1970s slowed considerably in the 1980s and 1990s,
the First Circuit found that the university failed the continuing expansion
297. Brief for Amici Curiae at 17, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st. Cir. 1996)
(No. 95-2205); see also supra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
298. See OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
299. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
300. Cohen 11, 991 F.2d at 898 n.15.
301. Ferrier, supra note 43, at 867.
302. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898.
303. Id.; Cohen 11, 991 F.2d at 892; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 981.
304. Hearing,supra note I11, at 78-85 (statement of Vartan Gregorian, President of Brown
University).
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test. ' 5 While lauding the "impressive growth" of Brown's athletic
offerings in the 1970s, the court said that "a university must design
expansion in whatever form and at whatever pace to respond to the flux
and reflux of unserved interests."3°6 And even though the number of
women's teams at Brown rose to 18 in the 1994-95 athletic year, the
district court in the 1995 trial still found the university deficient under
the second benchmark."
Brown University's experience demonstrates that the continuing
expansion test adds little to the three-part test's ostensible "flexibility."
Rather than providing schools with a feasible alternative to the
proportionality test, the three-part test exceeds the draconian safe harbor
in difficulty-no school has yet met the benchmark in any litigated Title
IX case. The courts have been quick to recognize the near impossibility
of satisfying the continuing expansion test, but also have been quick to
defer to the Policy Interpretation. In Roberts, the Tenth Circuit stated
that it "recognize[d] that in times of economic hardship, few schools
will be able to satisfy Title IX's effective accommodation requirement
3 8 but it
by continuing to expand their women's athletics programs,""
still upheld the validity of the benchmark and found that Colorado State
failed to meet it.3"
For universities, then, the choice between the proportionality test and
the continuing expansion test resembles a choice between death by
sword or death by hanging. The courts have stated that a school can
survive the second benchmark only through a systematic, fluid athletic
expansion, regardless of the cost. 310 But the same courts also have
stated that Title IX does not require schools to find an endless supply
of money to pour into their increasingly ravenous athletic departments.3 1' The exasperating question, then, is how can a school show
a fluid history of expansion without engaging in the spendthrift behavior
that the courts have deemed unnecessary? 312 Perhaps there is a way for
schools to increase sports funding gradually while meeting all unmet
athletic interests along the way, and, at the same time, not break their
banks. But any such solution cannot involve cutting men's sports, since

305. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 903.
306. Id.
307. Cohen II, 879 F. Supp. at 211.
308. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830; see also Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 992 ("Cutting athletic
budgets because of total school budget constraints has been common throughout the United
States in recent years.").
309. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830.
310. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 903.
311. See id. at 898 n.15.
312. See Ferrier, supra note 43, at 867.
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the second benchmark cannot be satisfied "by reducing opportunities for
the over represented sex alone or by reducing participation opportunities
for the over represented sex to a proportionately greater degree than for
the underrepresented sex.'313
The proportionality test, however, can be satisfied by the elimination
of men's sports, thereby making the first benchmark the most feasible
one of the three.314 As the Tenth Circuit advised in Roberts,
"[f]inancially strapped institutions may still comply with Title IX by
cutting athletic programs such that men's and women's athletic
participation rates become substantially proportionate to their representation in the undergraduate population."3 5
Another troubling way in which the proportionality test consumes the
"continuing expansion" test involves how much a school's athletic
program must expand to meet the second benchmark. OCR refuses to
specify how much expansion is enough, or the rate at which the
expansion must take place. 6 Presumably, then, the only way schools
can be assured of compliance is by continually expanding its female
athletic program until participation rates reach proportionality. Unless
and until female participation rates are substantially proportionate to
female enrollment rates, no expansion of an athletic program can
reliably be said to have satisfied the interests and abilities of student
athletes. Regardless of the speed with which a school like Brown
develops its women's athletic program, as long as there are unserved
athletic interests, the school's expansion is likely to be found wanting-unless of course proportionality is met. In short, with vague rules
on how the second benchmark can be satisfied, the courts have
collapsed the proportionality test into the "continuing expansion" test,
as the latter provides the only sure-fire, feasible way to satisfy the
former.
317
3. Benchmark Three of the Three-Part Test:
Title IX's Fait Accompli

If the second benchmark can be described as nearly impossible to
satisfy, the third benchmark can be described as nearly invisible. In
essence, the third benchmark adds little or nothing to the previous two
tests, as it asks whether the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex have been "fully and effectively accommodated by
313. CLARIFICATION, supra note 153, at 6.
314. Cant-i, supra note 108, at 4.
315. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830.
316. CLARIFICATION, supra note 153, at 5-8.
317. See OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979).
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the present program."' In reality, such an inquiry is merely rhetorical,
as it is answered by the existence of the Title IX suit itself. By
definition, the interests and abilities of female athletes-assuming they
are the underrepresented sex-are not being fully and effectively met
whenever a school cuts an existing team. Thus, "the only time courts
will have to grapple with benchmark three will be when a small group
'
of athletes sues for the creation of a new team."319
For example, in Cohen, the First Circuit found Brown's defense
under the third benchmark to be foreclosed by the very existence of the
Title IX lawsuit." Noting that the full and effective accommodation
issue may be "complicated" when athletes seek a new team, the court
found that "there is unlikely to be any comparably turbid question as to
interest and ability where, as here, plaintiffs are seeking merely to
32 Similarly, in
forestall the interment of healthy varsity teams.""
Roberts, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the easy case from the hard
one: "Questions of fact under this third prong will be less vexing when
plaintiffs seek the reinstatement of an established team rather than the
creation of a new one."'3 Since the plaintiffs in Roberts were members of a recently terminated varsity softball team, the court's decision
that Colorado State failed the third benchmark was a fait accompli.
Another way in which the courts have written benchmark three
effectively out of existence is by blurring the distinction between it and
the proportionality test. The First Circuit in Cohen set the standard by
rejecting Brown's argument that a school fully and effectively accommodates female athletes if it allocates athletic opportunities in accordance with the ratio of interested and able women to interested and able
men, rather than the ratio of women athletes to the university's total
female population.3' The First Circuit explained how the third benchmark closely resembles the proportionality test by using the example of
a hypothetical university with a student body of 1000 men and 1000
women, which include 500 able and interested male athletes, and 250
able and interested female athletes. u
According to the court, to satisfy the proportionality test, this
hypothetical university would have to provide a roughly equal number
of participation slots for men and women, since the student body is

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See id.
See Ferrier, supra note 43, at 867 (citing Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832).
See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904.
Id.
Roberts, 998 F.2d at 832.

323. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899.
324. Id.
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equally divided.3" In the alternative, the university could satisfy the
third benchmark instead of the proportionality test. According to the
court, to satisfy the third benchmark the university must provide at least
250 participation slots for women.326 In a footnote, the court admitted
that this approach also would force a university to attain proportionality,
since the hypothetical university under benchmark three also would have
to provide
at least 250 slots for men to match the 250 slots for
327
women.
Astonishingly, then, in an attempt to demonstrate the independence
of the third benchmark, the court's example does exactly the opposite.
In the court's example, if the hypothetical university cannot accommodate at least 500 athletes, the school must allocate the participation slots
in proportion to the ratio of males to females in the student body-thus
writing the third benchmark out of existence. Only if the hypothetical
university can accommodate more than 500 athletes can the school
depart from the proportionality test-and only as long as every woman
who wants to participate gets the opportunity to do so. 3' Hence, under
the Cohen court's interpretation of the third benchmark, female athletes
will be accommodated at a far higher rate than male athletes in
contravention of Title IX's prohibition against sex discrimination and
affirmative action. 321
C. A Plague on Proportionality:The Judiciary'sEmerging
Skepticism Towards the ProportionalityTest
Since the landmark Cohen case, courts have followed lockstep
behind the First Circuit's decision to elevate the regulations' "interests
and abilities" factor, and the Policy Interpretation's corresponding threepart test, into the sole area of inquiry when ascertaining Title IX
compliance. 3" And as the cases demonstrate, the proportionality test
has dominated the three-part test because it is both ascertainable and
feasible. Unlike the continuing expansion test, universities can meet the
proportionality test without spending enormous sums of money that they
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 899 n.16.
328. In reality, the Clarificationemphasizes that not every woman who wants to participate
must be satisfied under the third benchmark. A university will fail to meet the third benchmark
if there is (1) an unmet interest in a particular sport, (2) sufficient ability to sustain a team in
a particular sport, and (3) a reasonable expectation of competition for the team. CLARIFICATION,
supra note 153, at 9.
329. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) & (b) (1990); Connolly & Adelman, supra note 287, at 915.
330. See, e.g., supra notes 223-28, 248-49, 287 and accompanying text; 34 C.F.R. §
106.41(c)(1) (1995); OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,417-18 (1979).
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do not have: the courts have explicitly authorized the elimination of
men's sports as a way to comply with proportionality.331 The proportionality test also gives schools the only articulated way to satisfy the
second benchmark. In addition, the full and effective accommodation
test, the third benchmark, cannot be satisfied whenever a women's team
seeks reinstatement and proportionality has not been reached. The third
benchmark is also collapsed into the proportionality test when female
demand the creation of a new team, but the school cannot afford
athletes
2
it.

33

Still, this is not to say that the proportionality test is more legitimate
than the other two inquiries within the three-part test. In fact, the
proportionality test has been most responsible for authorizing sex
discrimination and affirmative action in violation of Title IX and its
legislative history.333 Strangely, though, the courts have done nothing
but defer to this controversial agency rule that has radically changed the
original 1972 antidiscrimination statute into an affirmative action
measure. That is, the courts have done nothing until recently.
1. Pedersonv. Louisiana State University 4
At first glance, Pederson did not seem like a case that would shake
the foundations of Title IX. After all, the plaintiffs looked the part of
the sympathetic, courageous athletes yearning to compete, while the
defendant, Louisiana State University (LSU), had arguably exhibited
disturbing callousness towards the complaining parties in particular, and
women's intercollegiate sports in general.
In Pederson, the plaintiffs represented a class of female students,
enrolled at LSU since 1993, seeking injunctive relief under Title IX
when their athletic interests were not accommodated by the university. 3" In 1993, LSU decided to add varsity women's soccer and softball
to its complement of seven women's varsity teams, but by 1995 the
university had recruited few athletes, awarded few scholarships, and had
not even secured a facility in which the new teams could play.336 In
reality, adding softball was only a feeble act of reinstatement, as LSU
previously had fielded a successful women's varsity softball team until

331. See, e.g., Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898-99 n.15 (authorizing the elimination of men's sports
as a way to comply with the proportionality test); Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 n.9 (quoting Cohen,
991 F.2d at 898-99 n.15).
332. See supra notes 317-29 and accompanying text.
333. See supra pt. H.A.
334. 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).

335. Id. at 900.
336. Id. at 901, 901 n.20.
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its elimination in 1983. 3"' The university never gave a "credible"
reason for its original abandonment of the team.33
Judge Rebecca F. Doherty of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana339 immediately dismissed with prejudice
the claims of three of the plaintiffs-including the named plaintiff, Beth
Pederson-due to their lack of standing. 3" The court held that even
though LSU provided greater athletic opportunities for male students
than female students, these plaintiffs were not excluded from athletic
participation because they did not have the requisite ability to play
women's soccer above the club level; the three plaintiffs also had not
expressed a desire to participate in other sports at LSU. 4"
Turning to the merits of the remaining plaintiffs' Title IX claim,
Judge Doherty quickly challenged the legitimacy of the Policy Interpretation as an agency document not approved by Congress or the
President, that "is also susceptible, in part, to an interpretation distinctly
at odds with the statutory language."342 Instead of imitating Cohen and
its progeny, the court cited a United States Supreme Court case that said
that such administrative interpretations can provide guidance, but not
controlling power.343 The court then reviewed the three-part test,
noting that both the plaintiffs and defendants propounded that the
proportionality test was the primary test of Title IX compliance.'

337. Id. at 901.
338. Id.
339. Judge Doherty presides in the Western District Court of Louisiana, but was assigned
this case after the two sitting judges of the Middle District recused themselves. The case,
however, remained filed within the Middle District of Louisiana. Id. at 897.
340. Id. at 908.
341. Id. at 907. In particular, the court noted that Beth Pederson was cut from the fledgling
varsity soccer team because of a knee injury and lack of skill. Id.
342. Id. at 911-12.
343. Id. at 912 n.51 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). In
Skidmore, the Supreme Court rejected an administrative interpretation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act as erroneous:
"We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."
Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
344. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 912-13. During the period in question, LSU's student
population was approximately 51% male and 49% female, but the school had a 71%-29% maleto-female athletic participation ratio. Id. at 915.
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In a stunning rebuke of Cohen and its progeny, Judge Doherty "most
emphatically" rejected the entire concept of proportionality, and found
the judiciary's previous interpretations of Title IX to be "erroneous in
this regard."' 5 The court explained that the proportionality test is
based on the faulty assumption that "interest and ability to participate
in sports is equal as between all men and women on all campuses."
Noting that neither of the parties in this case, nor the courts in Cohen
or Roberts, had offered evidence in support of this dubious proposition,
the court refused to accept it blindly:347
Without some basis for such a pivotal assumption, this
Court is loathe to join others in creating the "safe harbor"
or dispositive assumption for which defendants and plaintiffs argue. Rather, it seems much more logical that interest
in participation and levels of ability to participate as
percentages of the male and female populations will vary
from campus to campus and region to region and will
change with time. To assume, and thereby mandate, an
unsupported and static determination of interest and ability
as the cornerstone of the analysis can lead to unjust
results.34
Judge Doherty then turned once again to the issue of administrative
deference, and determined that, contrary to previous Title IX holdings,
the entire concept of proportionality is not found within the statute or
regulations, and actually runs counter to the mandate of the original
antidiscrimination statute. 49 Noting that 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b)3"
specifically prohibits the kind of proportionality mandated by the Policy
Interpretation and subsequent court decisions, Judge Doherty held that
the proportionality requirement is an overly mechanical, utterly baseless
rule that contradicts Title IX and thus cannot serve as either a safe
harbor or a test of Title IX compliance.351
Instead, Judge Doherty said that a proper "effective accommodation"
analysis requires a court to examine whether a school has "select[ed] [ ]
sports appropriate to the student body's interests and that the level of

345. Id. at 913.
346. Id.

347. Id.
348. Id. at 913-14.
349. Id. at 914.
350. Judge Doherty's opinion mistakenly refers to this provision as 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
351. Id.
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competition reflect[s] the ability of athletes available to participate. '
The court based this inquiry on the dictates of the Policy Interpretation,
which, before it sets out its controversial three-part compliance test,
states that to accommodate the interests and abilities of male and female
athletes, institutions must provide both the opportunity for participation
and a level of competition that adequately reflects the athletes'
abilities.353
To determine compliance under these two requirements, the court
looked at the remaining two prongs of the three-part test. Beginning
with the full and effective accommodation prong, the court found it
crucial that a school attempts to discover, through such methods as
interviews and questionnaires, the interests and abilities of its students.3 " According to the court, LSU never tried to learn what the
interests and abilities of its student population were. 5 Moreover, at
least with respect to softball, this was not one of the tough cases under
the third benchmark where a small group of students demanded the
creation of a new team. 6 The court found that LSU inexplicably had
disbanded a successful women's softball team, and that student interest
in softball had increased rather than decreased following the cut."
Thus, under the third prong of the three-part test, LSU failed to comply
with Title IX.
The court then decided that LSU failed the second prong of the
three-part test by failing to add any women's teams for 14 years.358
Even though LSU made a verbal commitment in 1993 to add women's
softball and soccer, the court determined that LSU failed to live up to
its word. 59 In addition, not only had LSU failed to demonstrate a
continuing expansion of women's athletics on its own campus, but the
university had led a minority movement within the NCAA to resist
proposed gender equity rules for all member institutions."
Concluding that LSU violated Title IX, Judge Doherty chastised the
university for its "arrogant ignorance, confusion regarding the practical

352. Id. at 915.
353. OCR Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979); see also supra notes 104-06
and accompanying text (discussing the interests and abilities accommodation requirement
described in the Policy Interpretation).
354. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915 n.61. Judge Doherty developed a non-exclusive list of
six acceptable methods for gathering the information. Id.
355. Id. at 915.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 916.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 917.
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requirements of the law, and a remarkably outdated view of women and
36 But since LSU's violations stemmed from ignorance and
athletics.""

not intentional discrimination, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for
monetary damages." Instead, the court ordered LSU to produce a
"reasonable and adequate" plan to enable the school's athletic program
to comply with Title IX.
2. Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pefia
While Pederson represents the first time a court has weakened the
foundations of Title IX by explicitly rejecting the proportionality
test,3" the incipiency of a Title IX collapse may actually have come
one year earlier in a case arising under the Fifth Amendment's Equal

Protection guarantee. 3"

In Adarand, a division of the United States Department of Transpor-

tation (DOT) awarded a prime highway construction contract to
Mountain Gravel & Construction Company, which in turn solicited bids
from subcontractors for a portion of the contract.367 Adarand Constructors submitted the low bid, but the subcontract was awarded instead to

Gonzales Construction Company, which qualified as a small business
controlled by " 'socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.' "" Mountain Gravel admitted that Adarand would have won the
361. Id. at 918.
362. Id.; see Franklin,503 U.S. at 75 n.8 (recognizing the availability of monetary damages
under Title IX for intentional discrimination). Judge Doherty mentioned that one example of
LSU's ignorance was its athletic director's continued belief that his women's athletics program
was "wonderful." Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 919. To demonstrate the sincerity of the athletic
director's ignorance, the court noted that the athletic director went so far as to invite an OCR
investigator to assess his program. Id. According to Judge Doherty, "[w]hen one is intentionally
breaking the law, one does not invite those who enforce that law to come and look over your
shoulder." Id.
363. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 922.
364. 115 S. Ct 2097 (1995).
365. See Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913-14.
366. See Adarand, 115 S. CL at 2097. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution applies only to the states, but the Supreme Court
has held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees the same equal protection
to the federal government. See id. at 2108, 2111 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93
(1976)); Brian C. Eades, Casenote, The UnitedStates Supreme Court Goes Color-Blind:Adarand
Constructors v. Pefia, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 771, 772 (1996).
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states in part: "No state shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Fifth Amendment states in part: "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law..... U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
367. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2102.
368. Id. (quoting the Appendix at 24).
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subcontract had the contractor not received additional compensation
from the federal government for hiring a socially and economically
disadvantaged subcontractor such as Gonzales;3 the relevant regulations allowed certain minority groups to enjoy a "presumption of social
and economic disadvantage."37 Claiming that this congressionallymandated program constituted race discrimination in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, Adarand sued the federal government.37'
In a 5-4 opinion, the United States Supreme Court adopted strict
scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for all race-based
classifications, even when the racial classification is ostensibly "benign."3" Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor extended the holding
in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 373 -which imposed strict scrutiny of
all race-based actions by state and local governments-to race-based
actions taken by the federal government.374 According to the Court,
since the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect persons and not
groups, any governmental action based on the group classification of
race must be subject to "detailed judicial inquiry" to preserve the
personal right to equal protection of the laws.375
Perhaps most relevant to gender classifications in Title IX cases,
Justice O'Connor emphasized that the difficulty of determining what
"so-called preference is in fact benign,
precludes courts from
lowering their exacting standard of inquiry, even in race-based affirmative action cases.3" In fact, the Court clearly conveyed its skepticism
towards the zero-sum nature of all race-based affirmative action
programs at all levels of government by stating that "[c]onsistency does
recognize that any individual suffers an injury when he or she is
disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever
that race may be. 378

369. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-656 (1994); Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation
Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106(c), 101 Stat. 132 (1994).
370. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2103 (citing 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.001, 19.703(a)(2) (1994)); see 13
C.F.R. § 124.105(b)(1) (1994); 49 C.F.R. § 23.62 (1994).
371. See id. at 2104.
372. Id. at 2112. To pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny, classifications must be
"narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests." Id. at 2113.
373. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
374. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2110.
375. Id. at 2112-13.
376. Id. at 2112 (quoting Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298
(1978)).
377. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
378. Id. at 2114.
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In the end, the Court concluded that the court of appeals had erred
in analyzing the case in terms of intermediate scrutinyY 9 The Court
remanded Adarand to the lower courts in light of its new, stricter
standard of inquiry."
In dissent, Justice Stevens observed an irony in the Court's decision.381 Unless Adarand is extended to gender-based classifications,
government will find it more difficult to enact affirmative action
programs for blacks than for women---even though the Equal Protection
Clause was designed primarily to end discrimination against former
slaves?" Indeed, since gender-based classifications continued to warrant
only intermediate scrutiny,383 the effect of Adarand was to subject
benign race classifications to a more stringent inquiry than the one
applied to the most invidious gender discrimination."'
3. United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia3 5
In Virginia, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia held that Virginia's refusal to admit women to its Virginia
Military Institute (VMI) satisfied the intermediate scrutiny test for
gender-based classifications.386 The United States had argued that the
Equal Protection Clause required Virginia to admit women into its allmale military college.38 7 Ruling for the Commonwealth, the court held
that the Equal Protection Clause required only that Virginia create a
state-supported all-female college program that will enable women to
"attain an outcome.., that is comparable to that received by young
'"
's
men upon graduation from
.fl
" The court concluded that the

379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

Id. at 2118.
Id.
Id. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. The Supreme Court established intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review for

sex classifications in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In contrast to strict scrutiny,
Craig held "that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. Intermediate scrutiny also
has been applied when the federal government is responsible for the gender-based classification,
see Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85-89 (1979), or when the classification is remedial in
nature. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982); see also John
Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutinyfor Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV.508, 510-29 (1993)
(reviewing the evolution of the standard of review for gender-based classifications).
384. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
385. 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), aft'd,44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied,
52 F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996).
386. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 473.

387. Id. at 473 n.2.
388. Id. at 473.
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Commonwealth's proposed all-female alternative to VMIl-the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at nearby Mary Baldwin College 389 -would not be a mirror image of VMI, but would still offer a
satisfactory "all-female program that will3 achieve substantially similar
outcomes in an all-female environment. 1
By focusing on outcomes rather than the process, the district court
acknowledged that men and women are not always similarly situated
individuals, but instead have real differences.3 1' The court explicitly
rejected the government's argument that any all-female alternative to
VMI must be "separate but equal" so that it "closely resembles, if not
clones, the physical plant, the curriculum, the methodology, the prestige,
and many of the other attributes of VMI. ' '3 2 Thus, even though VWIL
would use "a cooperative method which reinforces self-esteem rather
than the leveling process used by VMI," this was justifiable based on
the district court's finding that "most women reaching college generally
have less confidence than men. 393
Affirming the district court, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit applied "a heightened intermediate scrutiny test
389. See Jeffrey Rosen, Separate But Equal at VMJ: Like Race, Like Gender?, NEW
Feb. 19, 1996, at 24. Mary Baldwin College is located in Staunton, Virginia,
approximately 35 miles from the Lexington, Virginia home of VMI. Id.
390. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 481. Emphasizing that it was concerned more with the ends
of single-sex education than the means, the court opined that "[i]f VMI marches to the beat of
a drum, then Mary Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and when the march is over, both
will have arrived at the same destination." Id. at 484.
391. Id. at 476. "In the end, distinctions in any separate facilities provided for males and
females may be based on real differences between the sexes, both in quality and quantity, so
long as the distinctions are not based on stereotyped or generalized perceptions of differences."
Id. (quoting Faulkner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993)); see supra note 295 and
accompanying text.
392. Id. at 475.
393. Id. at 476. One commentator has noted that VWIL's less demanding environment not
only reflects a belief in the real differences between men and women, but also serves as "an
explicit rejection of everything that makes VMI unique." Rosen, supra note 389, at 25. Only
months after VWIL's establishment, this commentator lamented:
REPUBLIC,

As a result, the VWIL program is not even plausibly equal to VMI. Students in the
program live in the ordinary dorms of Mary Baldwin College; attend most of their
classes with Mary Baldwin students; are not required to wear uniforms except
during ROTC; and are generally supported rather than harassed. And Mary Baldwin
suffers in comparison to VMI in other, more intractable ways: 100 points lower
average SAT scores, lower faculty salaries, no engineering program for the B.S.
degree, and so forth. All in all, the argument goes, Mary Baldwin is to VMI as
Pine Manor (rather than Wellesley) is to Harvard.
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specially tailored to the circumstances" of this case." The court's
"heightened" intermediate scrutiny test included "the additional step of
carefully weighing the alternatives available to members of each gender
denied benefits by the classification.""39 In this case, this meant
inquiring into the "substantive comparability" of the two separate
military programs provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia."
According to the court, this extra step was necessary in all "case[s]
where the classification [was] not directed per se at men or women, but
at homogeneity of gender." 3" The Fourth Circuit explained that such
situations warranted a more searching inquiry because when the
classification is "directed at homogeneity of gender,"398 the classification and the objective merge and the second prong of the traditional
intermediate scrutiny test is rendered toothless.3 The first prong of
this test inquires into whether the state's objective in creating a genderbased classification is " 'legitimate and important.' "' The second
prong examines whether the gender-based classification" 'substantially
and directly furthers' that objective." ' 1 When the objective requires
homogeneity of gender, once the first prong is satisfied, the genderbased classification, by definition, not only furthers the objective, but is
logically necessary.' Thus, to give meaning to the traditional test, the
court added a third prong that required homogeneous gender classifications to confer "substantively comparable" benefits to both sexes.'
After determining that Virginia met the first two parts of the
heightened intermediate scrutiny test, the Fourth Circuit turned to its
third prong and held that the Equal Protection Clause's requirement of
comparable opportunities for each sex did not mandate identical
programs at VMI and Mary Baldwin. The Fourth Circuit said that
the substance of each military program must be comparable, although
not necessarily "in form and detail.'" 5 Implicitly accepting the real

394. United States v. Commonwealth of Va., 44 F.3d 1229, 1232 (4th Cir. 1995).

395. Id. at 1237.
396. Id.
397. Id.

398. Id.
399. Id. For a more complete description of the intermediate scrutiny test and its origins,
see supra note 383.
400. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1236.
401. Id. at 1237.
402. Id.; see also id. at 1239 ("ITihe only way to realize the benefits of homogeneity of
gender is to limit admission to one gender.').

403. Id. at 1237 ("We will call this third step an inquiry into the substantive comparability
of the mutually exclusive programs provided to men and women." (emphasis added)).

404. Id. at 1240-41.
405. Id. at 1240.
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differences doctrine, the court concluded that the "adversative and
pervasive military regimen"'
of the men's school need not be
duplicated at the women's school-unless "it is true that women,
subjected to the same grating of mind and body, respond in the same
way men do. .. ." Because the government did not offer sufficient
evidence to prove that men and women would respond in the same way
to the same stimuli, the Fourth Circuit held for Virginia."8
Trying one final time to make VMI co-educational, the Clinton
administration appealed the Fourth Circuit's ruling to the United States
Supreme Court, where it pursued a startling strategy.' Attempting to
close the gap between judicial treatment of gender and racial classifications, the government asked the Supreme Court to extend strict
scrutiny to all sex-based classifications.410 In an attempt to create new
opportunities for women, "[tlhe Clinton administration.. . dramatically
raised the stakes" '' in its war against VMI, and in so doing, unintentionally imperiled Title IX.
Although the government had not called for strict scrutiny in the
previous six years of litigating this case through lower courts,4"2 its
brief submitted to the Supreme Court declared "that strict scrutiny is, in
fact, the correct constitutional standard for evaluating differences in
official treatment based on sex, and that the complete exclusion of
women from VMI's unique and valued public educational program
should be reviewed under that standard."4 3 Cognizant that the Court

406. Id.
407. Id. at 1241. Underscoring the court's apparent acceptance of the real differences
between men and women, the court had quoted, Dr. Heather Anne Wilson, the Dean of Students
at Mary Baldwin as saying that
"the VMI model is based on the premise that young men come with [an] inflated
sense of self-efficacy that must [be] knocked down and rebuilt.... What [women]
need is a system that builds their sense of self-efficacy through meeting challenges,
developing self-discipline, meeting rigor and dealing with it, and having successes."
Id. at 1234 (quoting Dr. Heather Anne Wilson). According to Dr. Wilson, who also was on the
task force charged with developing VWIL, women do not need their sense of self-efficacy
knocked down, as'" 'women had that leveling experience already in their lives, and they do not
need more of that in college.' " Rosen, supra note 389, at 25 (quoting Dr. Wilson).
408. Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1241.
409. Petitioner's Brief at 33-36, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 941941).
410. See Rosen, supra note 389, at 26-27.
411. Id.
412. Frank J. Murray, Justices Tackle VMI Case; U.S. Seeks "Strict Scrutiny," WASH.
TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1996, at A6.
413. Petitioner's Brief at 33, Virginia (No. 94-1941).
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recently had extended the scope of strict scrutiny for racial classifications in Adarand, the petitioners asserted that "sex, like race, is an
' thus rendering gender
immutable and highly visible characteristic,"414
415
'
classifications "illegitima[te]" and" 'inherently suspect.' ,,416
In its brief, the government roundly attacked the lower courts' notion
that real differences between men and women justify the preservation
of Virginia's single-sex military colleges.417 Condemning the "stereotyping" ' motivating the lower courts' acceptance of the "real differences" doctrine, the petitioners proclaimed that "VMI stands as an
official monument to the discredited view that women are categorically
'
different from, and in many respects inferior to, men."419
Because
VWIL was based not on VMI's rigorous program, but rather on "archaic,
sex-based stereotypes and generalizations about the sociological and
'2 the government
psychological characteristics of women and men,"
concluded that equal protection means opening up VMI to female
students.42 '
Fortunately for Title IX, the Supreme Court was swayed only so far.
Reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court agreed with the government that
the separate education offered to women at VWIL was "substantially
different and significantly unequal" from that offered at VMI. ' But,
most importantly for the future of Title IX, the Court resisted the
Clinton administration's pleas to extend strict scrutiny to all genderbased classifications. 42
Title IX, however, may not have escaped unscathed, as Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion could provide ammunition for future attacks
on the venerable antidiscrimination statute in at least two ways. First,
although the Court did not expressly apply strict scrutiny to the sexbased classification in Virginia, it seemed to deviate from the traditional
intermediate scrutiny standard. The majority repeatedly emphasized that
"[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that ac-

414. Id. at 34.
415. Id. at 36.
416. Id. at 35 (quoting Frontero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality

opinion)).
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 15-16.
United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2286 (1996).
See id. at 2276 n.6.
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tion."4 4 In so doing, the Court criticized the "deferential review in
which the Court of Appeals engaged," which was "inconsistent with the
more exacting standard our precedent requires."4" Although the Court
agreed with the Fourth Circuit that a "heightened" scrutiny test was
necessary in this case,426 the Supreme Court determined that the Fourth
Circuit's idea of height-in the form of the "substantive comparability"
test-was not high enough, as it was too deferential for the genderbased classifications of today.427
The fact that the Court's "exceedingly persuasive justification"
language differed from the traditional intermediate scrutiny standard for
gender-based classifications was not lost on Justices Rehnquist and
Scalia. For Justice Rehnquist, the concern was precision, as he wrote
separately to express that it was "unfortunate that the Court thereby
introduce[d] an element of uncertainty respecting the appropriate
test."" For Justice Scalia, however, the suspicion was that the "exceedingly persuasive justification" requirement was a subtle attempt to
refashion the intermediate scrutiny test into a more searching inquiry.429

In a passionate dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of
"sweep[ing] aside the precedents of this Court" by "drastically revis[ing]
our established standards for reviewing sex-based classifications.""
Noting that the government had urged the Court to apply strict scrutiny
to sex-based classifications, the dissent stated that the Court, "while
making no reference to the Government's argument, effectively accepts
it."' 431 Justice Scalia concluded that the Court's adoption of the "exceedingly persuasive justification" requirement constituted a "de facto
abandonment of the intermediate scrutiny" test in favor of an amorphous
new test that is "indistinguishable from strict scrutiny. 432
The second way in which Virginia could undermine Title IX is
through the majority's reaffirmation of the real differences doctrine.
Recognizing that "inherent differences" are no longer accepted as a
ground for race or national origin classifications, the Court nonetheless

424. See, e.g., id. at 2274 (emphasis added).
425. Id. at 2286.
426. Compare 44 F.3d at 1232 with 116 S. Ct. at 2286.
427. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2286.
428. Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
429. Id. at 2291 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
430. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
431. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
432. Id. at 2294-95, 2306 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Among other proof that the majority's
"exceedingly persuasive justification" language was more than mere dicta, Justice Scalia noted
that the Court invoked the phrase nine times in its opinion. Id. at 2294.
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stated that "[p]hysical differences between men and women... are
enduring: '[T]he two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of
both.' "" In a sentence that could provide fodder for both sides of the
Title IX debate, Justice Ginsburg then emphasized that the "inherent
differences" between men and women "remain cause for celebration, but
not for denigration of the members of ' either
sex or for artificial
434
constraints on an individual's opportunity.
D. Analysis of the Recent Judicial Challenges to Title IX
Had there been no rumblings beneath Title IX's regulatory surface
for more than a decade, the Pederson ruling might be dismissed as sui
generis and forgotten. 435 But Judge Doherty's stinging rebuke of the
proportionality test capitalized on, and added to, the anti-quota
momentum building in the courts and Congress.4M At the very least,
Judge Doherty's opinion offers a judicial imprimatur to the growing
voices of protest against the draconian proportionality test, and has
given hope to exasperated university administrators whose pleas for
clear, feasible gender equity requirements had fallen on deaf ears in the
courts. 437 Although it is too early to know Pederson's full impact on
Title IX law, Judge Doherty's opinion may already have had lasting
ramifications beyond the LSU campus. Indeed, her words seem to have
resonated among some judges and government officials, who may be
heeding Pederson'swarnings to proceed with caution when applying the
proportionality test.
For example, in a surprising move six weeks after the Pederson
ruling, OCR agreed to suspend its investigation of the University of
Minnesota's athletic department, even though the university made no
promises to meet proportionality. 438 The university contended that

433. Id. at 2275 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
434. Id.

435. Indeed, this was the immediate public reaction of at least one surprised Title IX
advocate, who announced that Judge Doherty appeared to misunderstand the three-part test, but
still ruled consistently with previous Title IX cases. Bill Campbell, Judge May Have Erred in
Case: Legal Analyst Says LSU Got Off Easy, NEw ORLEANs TIMEs-PICAYUNE, Jan. 20, 1996,
at D7.
436. See, e.g., supra notes 364-83 and accompanying text (discussing Adarand, 115 S. Ct.
at 2097); infra notes 472-94 and accompanying text.
437. After the Pederson ruling, Walter B. Connolly, one of Brown University's lead

attorneys, exemplified the newfound optimism among Title IX opponents: "Plaintiffs have to be
seared," he said. Mike Szostak, Brown University, Athletes Wrestle with Title IX-Related
Decision at LSU, PROVIDENCE SUNDAY J., Feb. 11, 1996, at C6.
438. Gregor W. Pinney, Government Suspends Gender Equity Inquiry at "U," STAR TRm.
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exact proportionality was not required, and OCR agreed, accepting the
school's promise to bring female athletic participation up to 44% of all
athletes; women comprise 49% of the university's total undergraduate
enrollment.439 Interestingly, for reasons unknown, in this case OCR
decided to depart from its stated policy: the agency's January 1996
Clarificationindicates that a 5% disparity between female participation
and enrollment may be a per se violation of the proportionality test."0
In addition, although she was ultimately successful, Amy Cohen's
Title IX lawsuit encountered judicial resistance for the first time while
on appeal after remand. Three months after Pederson, during oral
argument before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
Chief Judge Juan R. Torruella expressed "some basic problem" with the
March 1995 district court decision finding Brown in violation of Title
IX.44 Judge Torruella would later put his Title IX concerns in writing,
as he issued a fervent dissent from the two-person majority opinion in
Cohen.
Judge Torruella's dissent first challenged the majority's application
of the "law of the case" doctrine, stating that Adarand changed the law
on "so-called 'benign' gender-conscious governmental actions" since the
prior panel's ruling in the first Cohen appeal." 2 Refusing to rubber
stamp the earlier panel's deference to the proportionality test as a benign
affirmative action measure, Judge Torruella stated that Adarand shows
that the earlier panel was wrong in assuming "that a regulation slanted
in favor of women would be permissible."" 3
Second, the dissent argued that the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Virginia also rendered the law of the case doctrine inapplicable to this
case. According to Judge Torruella, the Supreme Court in Virginia
elevated its intermediate scrutiny test for gender-based classifications to
require a more searching, "skeptical scrutiny of official action denying
rights or opportunities based on sex ...which requires that parties who
seek to defend gender-based government action demonstrate "an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action."'
Thus, the
dissent maintained that the prior panel's holding in Cohen is flawed

(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 24, 1996, at B2.
439. Id.
440. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. The Clarificationeven indicates that
a disparity of only 1% may also be a violation of the proportionality test. See supra note 146.
441. Mike Szostak, Title IX: Brown Renews Its Battle with Female Athletes, PROVIDENCE
L-BULL., Apr. 2, 1996, at D3.
442. Cohen I1,101 F.3d at 190 (Torruella, J.,
dissenting).
443. Id. at 189 (citing Cohen, 991 F.2d at 901) (Torruella, J.,dissenting).
444. Id. at 190 (quoting Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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"both because it applies a lenient version of intermediate scrutiny that
is impermissible following Adarand and because it did not apply the
'exceedingly persuasive justification' test of Virginia." 5
Judge Torruella then proceeded to attack the district court's
interpretation of the three-part test. Deeming the three-part test a "quota
scheme" as adopted by the district court, the dissent noted correctly that
"Congress, if anything, expressed an aversion to quotas as a method to
enforce Title IX," and found that the appellees failed to meet their
burden under Virginia to demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for Title IX's benign, gender-based classification." 7
Whether or not Pederson is directly responsible for the sudden
change in attitude by OCR and the misgivings expressed by the Chief
Judge of the First Circuit towards the three-part test, it is clear that
Judge Doherty's ruling represents the first sign of judicial discontent
with the bureaucratic transformation of Title IX from an
antidiscrimination statute into a license for discrimination against male
athletes. In the long run, Pederson may be the spark that ignites the
courts into rejecting the entire three-part test as inconsistent with Title
IX's express prohibition against preferences for either sex.' While
Cohen paved the way for extensive judicial deference to an agency
interpretation that was neither reviewed nor approved by Congress or the
President, Pederson may signal that the courts are ready to reign in
OCR and assert greater control over the compliance process.
Moreover, by rejecting the proportionality test, Judge Doherty has
bestowed new independence on the remaining two benchmarks of the
three-part test. Confining her analysis to the "continuing expansion" and
"effective accommodation" inquiries, Judge Doherty demonstrated how
the second and third benchmarks need not depend on the proportionality
test for meaning." 9
In the past, courts had rendered the "continuing expansion" benchmark nearly impossible to satisfy by ordering universities to increase
participation opportunities at an unlimited pace to satisfy unserved
athletic interests, with only proportionality standing in the way of
unlimited expenditures.4 ' As a result, the significance of the "continuing expansion" test was diminished.451 Proportionality engulfed the test
because it offered the only feasible, apparently sure method for schools
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

Id. at 191 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b); supra pt.H.A.
Id. at 197 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b); supra pt. H.A.
See Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 914-17.
See supra notes 307-16 and accompanying text.
See id.
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to comply with Title LX. 4 52 In rejecting the proportionality test, Judge
Doherty has forcibly separated it from the second benchmark, and, in
the process, has given schools real flexibility in meeting the three-part
test.
Spuming mechanical rules and rigid statistical tests, Judge Doherty
engaged in a fact-specific inquiry that focused on the good faith of the
institution. Thus, in addition to LSU's failure to add any women's teams
for 14 years, the court found it highly .probative that LSU had engaged
in such egregious conduct as lying about its expansion plan, attempting
to lead a minority revolt against proposed NCAA gender equity rules,
and demonstrating a sexist attitude overall.4 53 In short, but for LSU's
apparent disdain for its female athletes, its failure to add a certain
number of women's teams or to meet a certain participation quota would
probably not have been dispositive of a Title IX violation.
Similarly, the Pederson court divorced the "effective accommodation" benchmark from the proportionality test, and thus gave form to the
"invisible" provision.4 " Unlike the Court in Cohen, the Pederson court
did not make its decision as to "effective accommodation" based on
LSU's failure to divide its limited resources in a proportional way.455
Instead, Judge Doherty found it crucial that LSU never made an effort
to ascertain the athletic interests and abilities of its students either
through surveys, simple interviews, or for that matter, any other
means.4' Employing a fact-specific inquiry, the court held for the
plaintiffs, but provided the university the flexibility to consider
alternatives other than proportionality to satisfy Title IX."
Judge Doherty also gave meaning to this third benchmark by
ensuring that the plaintiffs actually had the abilities to compete on the
teams they sought to establish. Since none of the plaintiff soccer players
in Pederson had the requisite skill to participate at the intercollegiate
varsity level, the court found that LSU's failure to provide equal
opportunities for women could not have injured them. 45" This was not

452. See id.
453. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 916-20. Judge Doherty freely expressed her disgust for
LSU's "arrogant ignorance" and "remarkably outdated view of women and athletics" throughout
her opinion. Id. at 918. The editorial board of the local newspaper said the decision was a
"scathing denouncement of [Athletic Director Joe] Dean and his department.... Dean came out
looking like a sexist, whose testimony conflicted on significant points with that of other LSU
officials." LSU Victory Claim Sham, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Jan. 17, 1996, at B6.
454. See supra pt. III.B.3.
455. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899; supra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
456. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915.
457. Id. at 914, 916, 922.
458. Id. at 907-08.
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one of the "easy" cases under the third benchmark in which a recently
defunct team sues for reinstatement,459 as LSU had only recently promoted the soccer team to varsity status. Nevertheless, Judge Doherty's
searching inquiry into the athletic skills of each plaintiff should
encourage future courts in such "hard" cases to ask if the would-be
athlete has the requisite ability to go along with her interest. As
Pedersondemonstrates, if universities have to accommodate the interests
and abilities of their athletes, then plaintiffs should have to show
conclusively that they have the abilities to begin with.
All in all, while Pederson may be the catalyst for increased judicial
skepticism towards Title IX, and its proportionality test in particular,
Pederson alone is unlikely to cause Title IX's downfall. But coupled
with Adarand, Virginia, and a growing resentment towards Title IX in
Congress, Pedersonmay certainly contribute to the statute's demise. If
Pederson's undermining of the proportionality test is not enough to
convince OCR, Congress or the courts to revisit the statute begin anew,
then perhaps Adarand or Virginia will.
Adarand also may operate to undermine the proportionality test.
Although the Supreme Court spoke about racial, not gender, classifications, both benign and discriminatory, the remedial policy at issue in
Adarand somewhat resembled Title IX. In Adarand, the Court questioned a remedial program created by Congress that compelled a specific
result through the use of a "race-based rebuttable presumption" in
'
Despite the great
the hiring of "disadvantaged subcontractors."461
deference usually afforded Congress, the Court, by remanding for
application of "strict scrutiny" review, essentially overturned the
congressionally-mandated program.' By comparison, at issue in Title
IX cases is a gender-based, administratively-created remedial program
that compels a specific result in intercollegiate athletics: an increase in
women's athletic participation rates until they are substantially proportionate to female enrollment. 3 But unlike Adarand, the classification
system at issue in Title IX cases emanates not from Congress but from
an agency's interpretative document that was never reviewed or
approved by Congress or the President-a document that is inconsistent
with the wording of the underlying statute and its legislative history.4
Thus, even if Justice Scalia is wrong about the Supreme Court's
459. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 904.
460. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105.
461. Id. at 2118.
462. See id.; see also id. at 2123-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that precedent
requires giving great deference to Congress in this area); Hastert, supra note 152, at 4.
463. See Hastert, supra note 152, at 4.
464. See id.
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extension of Adarand's strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications in
Virginia,46' Adarand still cautions against excessive deference when
group-based affirmative action is at issue--especially when the
affirmative action was established by an unelected federal agency rather
than an elected national legislature.
Equally threatening to Title IX is the possibility that Justice Scalia
is right that the Virginia Court furtively extended Adarand's standard of
review to all gender classifications. Indeed, as an administrative
agency's sex-based classification that disadvantages male athletes, it is
doubtful that Title IX could survive strict scrutiny.' As Justice
Thurgood Marshall recognized in a racial classification case, strict
scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."467 The last racial classification to survive the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test was the
infamous
Japanese internment case of Korematsu v. United States in
46
1944. 1

In addition, even if Title IX escapes the grasps of strict scrutiny, it
is uncertain whether its leading benchmark can withstand the skepticism

465. See supra notes 431-32 and accompanying text.
466. Cognizant of the potential repercussions from a government victory in Virginia, some
women's rights advocates formed an unlikely coalition with VMI to fight against the
government's co-educational plans. See, e.g., David G. Savage, SeparateBut Equal, Part II: As
the All-Male Virginia Military Institute Defends Itself in Court, It is Getting Some Supportfrom
Women's Rights Advocates, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Jan. 7, 1996, at C1 ("[A] surprising
number of prominent female lawyers and educators say that [strict scrutiny] would not be a final
victory but a setback for many young women.... What about women's and men's prisons, they
ask. What about battered women's shelters? What about high school and college sports, where
'separate but equal' is the prevailing philosophy?").
Realizing that if VMI went the way of strict scrutiny, so goes Title IX, the Independent
Women's Forum filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to reject the Clinton
administration's arguments as potentially harmful to women. Murray, supra note 412; Women's
Group Urges Supreme Court to Keep Virginia Military Institute All Male, PR NEWSWIRE, Dec.
15, 1995, availablein Westlaw, ALLNEWSPLUS File. The Independent Women's Forum is a
non-profit, non-partisan organization based in Washington, DC. Id. Asserting that "real
differences" exist between men and women, the group asked the Court to keep the traditional
intermediate scrutiny standard for gender classifications. Id.
467. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Curiously,
however, the majority opinion in Adarand included a paragraph devoted solely to "dispel[ling]
the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, but fatal in fact." Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2117
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Adarand Court decried the "unhappy persistence" of
racial discrimination and maintained that "government is not disqualified from acting in response
to it." Id. Whether this passage indicates a new, more lenient strict scrutiny standard in the
future is not currently known.
468. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of people of Japanese ancestry during
World War II); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrTUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451-52;
see also Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1497 n.52
(1995) (discussing the difficulty of surviving strict scrutiny analysis).
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of judges that believe in the "real differences" between the sexes:
Pedersonprovides an example of what can happen to the proportionality
test when a court believes that men and women do not automatically
share the same interest in sports. 9
E. OCR's November Nightmare: Congress' New
Skepticism Towards Title IX
"Say goodbye to the OCR and Norma [Cantd]," gloated one Title IX
critic months after Republicans took control of both houses of the 104th
Congress in November 1994.7 Indeed, with enormous momentum and
political capital, the GOP seemed capable of delivering the "bold,
dramatic and immediate change" it long promised. 7 Especially
troubling to Title IX supporters were reports that the Republican
revolution was fueled by "angry white males" suspicious of big
government and resentful of affirmative action.' Not surprisingly,
Republicans responded to the electorate-of which white men comprised
40 percent and voted Republican by a 63%-37% margin 4 -by
immediately seizing on the issue of affirmative action and, in particular,
Title IX.
Not long after House Speaker Newt Gingrich vowed "cooperation,
yes; compromise, no" on the Republican agenda,474 his House troops
scheduled hearings on the abuses of Title IX.o4 5 Ominously for Title
469. See supra notes 334-63 and accompanying text.
470. Dale Anderson, Say Goodbye to the OCR and Norma (visited July 31, 1996)
On November 8, 1994,
<http:llwww.coe.unc.edul-jrlareauletcttitle9/anderson.html>.
Republicans gained 52 seats in the House of Representatives and 8 seats in the Senate to win
both houses of Congress for the first time since 1952. After the election, the House of
Representatives featured 230 Republicans, 204 Democrats and 1 independent, while the Senate
had 53 Republicans and 47 Democrats. See Gerald F. Seib & John Harwood, Shift in Power:
Big Republican GainsBring the PartyClose to Control of Congress,WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1994,
at Al; Campaigns of '94 Senate: GOP Grabs Control with 52 Seats, AM. POL. NETWORK
HEALTH LINE, Nov. 9, 1994, at 5; Campaigns of '94 House: Dem Cmte. Leaders Win Races,
Lose Gavels, AM. POL. NETWORK HEALTH LINE, Nov. 9, 1994, at 6.
471. Seib & Harwood, supra note 470, at A16 (quoting Rep. Bill Paxon of New York, who
led the GOP House campaign committee).
472. See David Jackson, Male Call at the Polls, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 28, 1994,
at Al ("The typical angry white male is generally regarded as fearful of the evolving global
economy, resentful of affirmative action, and alienated from politics and government."); Jessica
Gavora, College Women Get More than Their Sporting Chance, INSIGHT MAG., Jan. 22, 1996,
availablein WESTLAW, ALLNEWS file (recognizing that Title IX has alienated white males).
473. Peter A. Brown, White Male Voters Receptive to GOP Message, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 27, 1994, at A8.
474. Nancy Mathis, Democrats Told: Forget Compromise; But Gingrich Open to
"Cooperation," Hous. CHRON., Nov. 12, 1994, at 1.
475. Ana Puga, GOP Targets Sports Funds for Women; Equal Opportunity Measure
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IX supporters, leading the charge was Illinois Republican Representative
J. Dennis Hastert, a former high school football and wrestling coach and
the 104th Congress' new Chief Deputy Majority Whip.476 During four
hours of hearings on May 9, 1995 before the House Subcommittee on
Postsecondary Education, Training and Lifelong Learning, Representative Hastert decried Title IX as "the only civil rights law I know of
where innocent bystanders are punished. The unintentional consequences
has [sic] been the cutback of men's sports and not the growth of
women's
sports. It's a trend across the country and we want to stop
77
it.

,4

After the hearings, the chairman of the subcommittee, Representative
Howard "Buck" McKeon, wrote to DED's assistant secretary for civil
rights, Norma Cantti, seeking clarification of the Policy Interpretation.
The letter, co-authored by fellow Republican Steve Gunderson,
contained a subtle threat of congressional intervention if Secretary Canti
refused to comply: "It might obviate the need for a legislative clarification if the Department [of Education] provided a clear signal as to the
parameters of the obligation of colleges and universities to provide equal
athletic opportunities. 478 In response, OCR began drafting a document
479
that would eventually become the Clarification.
The prospect of congressional intervention into the Title IX
compliance process is not illusory: by June 1995, many members of
Congress had the will to change Title IX, and their numbers kept
growing. On June 30, 1995, Representative Hastert sent OCR a letter cosigned by 146 House members that criticized the agency's Title IX
stance.4"' In contrast, three weeks later, a rival letter supporting OCR's
Policy Interpretation garnered only 94 signatures.4 1
By August of 1995, the Republican Congress posed its greatest
challenge yet to Title IX when it accepted an amendment by GOP
Representative Ernest Istook that strips OCR of all federal funding used
for Title IX enforcement if the agency did not create additional Title IX
guidelines by December 31, 1995.82 The amendment was first intro-

Attacked by Men's Interests, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Apr. 18, 1995, at Al.
476. Andrew Gottesman, Backlashfrom Title IX Leads to CongressionalHearings;Schools
Are Eliminating Men's Sports, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 8, 1995, at CI.
477. Feuerherd, supra note 165.
478. Curtis & Grant, supra note 140.
479. Id.; see also supra notes 142-58 and accompanying text.
480. Curtis & Grant, supra note 140.
481. Id.
482. See Robert Marshall Wells, Appropriations:Delving into Realm of Policy, Panel OKs
Labor-HHS Bill, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., July 29, 1995, at 2280; Oscar Dixon, Representative
Seeks Title IX Guidelines, USA TODAY, July 26, 1995, at C3. The Istook Amendment stated:
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duced in the House of Representatives as a rider to a controversial GOP
appropriations bill that cut $9.3 billion from education programs for
disadvantaged children and job training for workers, while increasing
spending for military weapons.483
Even among the other controversial provisions in the appropriations
bill, the Istook Amendment was far from overlooked, as a heated debate
ensued over the provision. Skeptical of Representative Istook's
intentions, Title IX supporters accused the amendment's sponsor of
trying "to force the Office of Civil Rights to weaken its enforcement
standards.""' Democratic Representative Tom Lantos urged Congress
to "condemn[] the meanspirited and utterly sexist" attempt at derailing
Title IX.485
An attempt by Democratic Representative Patsy Mink to strike the
Istook Amendment from the appropriations bill failed.4 6 This prompted Democratic Representative Cardiss Collins, Title IX's most vocal
supporter in Congress and Representative Hastert's most prominent
adversary during the subcommittee hearings in May, to plead with
Congress to resist the Istook "sneak attack on Title IX" that "represents
47
an attack on Title IX and an effort to ensure that it is not enforced.,
Representative Collins then vowed to "continue to make sure that Title
IX is defended and upheld."'8
Ultimately, the controversial appropriations bill passed on a near
party-line vote of 219-208.49 After the vote, one newspaper's editorial
board complained that "[u]nder the guise of balancing the federal
None of the funds made available in this Act may be used by the Office of Civil
Rights of the Department of Education after December 31, 1995, to enforce Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) with respect to
gender equity in intercollegiate athletic programs, except when it is made known
to the Office that the Department has issued updated policy guidance to institutions
of higher education which includes specific criteria clarifying how such institutions
can demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program expansion for
members of the under-represented sex and full and effective accommodations of
the interests and abilities of the under-represented sex.
Curtis & Grant, supra note 140.
483. H.R. 2127, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Karen Hosler, Spending Bill Passes House
in Close Vote, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 4, 1995, at Al; GOP's Cuts Pass House; Democrats
Attack Bill that Slashes Social Programs, STAR-TRB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug. 4, 1995, at
Al [hereinafter GOP's Cuts].
484. 141 CONG. REc. H8194-02, H8206 (1995) (statement of Rep. Mink).
485. Id. at E1706-03 (statement of Rep. Lantos).
486. See id. at E1648-02 (statement of Rep. Collins); id. at H8194-02.

487. Id. at E1648-02 (statement of Rep. Collins).
488. Id.
489. GOP's Cuts, supra note 483.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

69

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4"7

budget, the Republican-led House last week mounted an assault on
women, working-class families and the poor that is contrary to this
nation's tradition of equality, compassion and fair play." 4" The
editorial's first illustration of the legislation's "poisoned apples in this
bag of goodies" was the House's attempt to undermine Title IX. 49
The appropriations bill, however, died in the Senate when a
Democratic filibuster precluded the Senate from considering the
measure.4" Because of the many controversial provisions in the bill, it
is unclear whether the Title IX amendment contributed to the bill's
demise in the Senate.493 Still, the actions by the House "marked the
most ambitious attack to date on Title IX," and demonstrated that Title
IX opponents have the upper hand in the House for the first time since
the antidiscrimination law was enacted in 1972. 49
Indeed, as long as the GOP controls both houses of Congress, the
legislative branch will likely remain hostile to Title IX. Future legislative measures to alter or destroy Title IX may find a more receptive
Senate audience once the bill is unencumbered by a host of radical
social and economic provisions. Perhaps most distressing for Title IX
advocates is that the next Congress will be without Title IX's chief
supporter, for Representative Cardiss Collins has announced her
retirement after 23 years on Capitol Hill.495 Whether another House

490. Editorial:An Assault on America, HARTFORD CouRANT, Aug. 6, 1995, at D2.
491. Id.
492. See John Boehner, BalancedBudget DownpaymentAct I, Government Press Releases,
Mar. 6, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 8783648; Don Nickles, 47 Filibustersand 12
Vetoes: Minority Tactics Bring Return of the "Gridlock Index," Government Press Releases,
Mar. 12, 1996, available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 8783855.
493. Among other provisions, the bill would have allowed states to deny Medicaid funds
for abortions for poor women in cases of rape or incest; curtailed the ability of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to enforce worker safety rules; and banned federal
funds for human embryo research. GOP's Cuts, supra note 483; An Assault on America, supra
note 490. After the House passed the bill, a group of Democratic female lawmakers told a press
conference that " 'It's payback time for the religious right ... and rollbacks for women's
rights.' " GOP Waging War on Women, Democrats Say; House Majority Leader's Spokesman
Calls Claims "Overblown Rhetoric, " ROCKY MOuNTAIN NEWS (Colorado), Aug. 4, 1995, at A50
(quoting Rep. Pat Schroeder).
494. Andrew Gottesman, HastertBandstandsfor Revisions in Title IX; Illinois Pol Thinks
Men's Sports Are Hit Too Hard, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 1995, at § 4-1; see Jonathan S. Landay,
ScrimmageMatch in Congress Over Money for Sports,CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, May 11, 1995,
at 1 ("[A] Republican-controlled Congress may give opponents the upper hand for the first time
since the law [Title IX] was passed in 1972.").
495. Steve Daley & Thomas Hardy, Collins Joining the '96 Exodus from Congress After
23 Years, Lawmaker Says She Won't Run Again, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 1995, at 1.
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member will be able to fill the void left by this highly respected
"political power" is unknown.4"
IV.

CONCLUSION

Since its passage in 1972, Title IX has been the catalyst for massive
growth in women's intercollegiate athletics, and has delivered a measure
of justice to spumed athletes such as Amy Cohen who were treated
unfairly by cost-cutting athletic administrators. But as male athletes like
Bill Kelley have learned, Title IX's regulatory framework has forced
low-revenue men's sports to pay the entire cost of gender equity. While
athletic directors continue to treat football as a sacred cow, men's
wrestling, gymnastics, and swimming teams have become the ultimate
losers of Title IX's zero-sum game.
By promulgating a three-part test that is dominated by a stringent
proportionality provision, the Department of Education's Office of Civil
Rights has transformed the 1972 statute from a law that prohibits
discrimination into a law that requires affirmative action in direct
contravention of Title IX's language and its legislative history. Based on
the dubious assumption that women and men share the exact same
interest in sports on all campuses, OCR's proportionality test has set a
rigid quota for female participation in intercollegiate athletics. And
although OCR has maintained that its three-part test provides "flexibility" in complying with Title IX,497 in reality, the proportionality
requirement is the only feasible choice for universities facing budget
constraints. The proportionality test is the only provision that allows
schools to comply with Title IX by eliminating men's teams instead of
spending unlimited amounts of money to fund women's teams. In
addition, the proportionality test engulfs the other two benchmarks, as
both the "continuing expansion" and the "effective accommodation"
tests depend on proportionality to give them meaning.
Although OCR's three-part test was neither reviewed nor approved
by Congress or the President, and is inconsistent with Title IX's
language and legislative history, exasperated university administrators
and frustrated male athletes received no relief from the courts. Cohen
and its progeny sanctioned the dominance of the draconian proportionality test, and gave great deference to an administrative agency's ability
to promulgate interpretations of its own regulations. 98
But just as men's intercollegiate gymnastics and wrestling neared
extinction, the tide has turned in the ongoing battle over Title IX. A
496. Id.
497. Cant-6, supra note 108, at 3-4.
498. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896-97.
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federal district court in Louisiana startled many observers by emphatically rejecting the proportionality test and the Cohen line of Title IX
cases.4 Refusing to defer to an agency interpretation that had no
grounding in "the explicit language" of the statute or its legislative
history, the Pederson case signaled an emerging judicial skepticism
towards the regulatory foundations of the venerable antidiscrimination
law." ° By challenging the legitimacy of the proportionality test,
Pederson essentially challenged the legitimacy of Title IX itself: since
Cohen, the proportionality test had become the sine qua non of Title IX
and its primary, if not sole, test of compliance. It is left to be seen
whether Title IX can survive with a weakened proportionality test in the
close cases where a university's conduct was not egregious.
In any event, this question may be moot, as Adarand demonstrates
the Supreme Court's skepticism towards remedial classifications that
result in reverse discrimination." 1 Ironically, however, perhaps the
greatest recent threat to Title IX came from its supporters in the Clinton
administration: if the government in Virginia had succeeded in
persuading the Supreme Court to apply strict scrutiny to all gender
classifications, Title IX could have been an unintended casualty. It is
possible, and even likely, that the Clinton administration will once again
attempt to extend Adarand's strict scrutiny standard to a future case
involving gender-based classifications. 5"
Lastly, even if Title IX escapes the scrutiny of an increasingly
critical judiciary, it may not survive Congress' new hostility to the
statute. Although the most recent Republican attempt to derail Title IX
fell short in the Senate, the GOP controlled House-and its Chief
Deputy Whip who is a former wrestling coach-have both the opportunity and political resolve to try again.
Twenty-five years after it was signed into law, Title IX is entering
a period of transition. Faced with an emerging skepticism from the
judiciary, a newfound hostility from the national legislature, and a
possible repeat of an unintentional, yet considerable threat from the
executive branch, Title IX may have to change to survive. Unless OCR
revamps the Policy Interpretation's three-part test to free Title IX from
its proportionality albatross, the antidiscrimination statute may not be
499. See supra text accompanying notes 345-63.
500. See supra text accompanying notes 334-63.
501. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114 ("Consistency does recognize that any individual
suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race,
whatever that race may be." (emphasis in original)).
502. See supra notes 413-19 and accompanying text; see also Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2293
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's use of" 'exceedingly persuasive justification' "at nine
locations in its opinion, and interpreting the phrase inconsistently with previous caselaw).
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able to withstand the intensifying pressure from all three branches of
government. Thus, in the end, the continuing, emotional debate over
which is the true face of Title IX may actually be irrelevant-because
Title IX itself may soon be irrelevant.
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